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INTRODUCTION 
These days, it can be difficult to read a newspaper without seeing a 
story of another journalist subpoenaed to identify a confidential 
source.  From Lance Williams and Mark Fainaru-Wada to Judith 
Miller and Jim Taricani, many reporters are becoming known more 
for the court proceedings against them than they are for the stories 
they write.  Pulitzer Prize-winning New York Times reporter James 
Risen, who broke the story on the Bush Administration’s illegal 
warrantless wiretapping program, is the latest casualty.2  Instead of 
reporting the news, journalists have become the news. 
Efforts to compel the identification of reporters’ sources are 
certainly nothing new.  As early as 1722, Benjamin Franklin’s brother 
was ordered by the state assembly to divulge the source of a tabloid 
he published about the government.  When he refused, he was jailed 
for one month.3  In 1848, the first reported federal case was brought 
against a reporter jailed for contempt of the Senate for refusing to 
identify the source of a secret draft of a Mexican-American War 
treaty.4  In 1857, a New York Times reporter was jailed after declining 
 2. Philip Shenon, Times Reporter Subpoenaed Over Source for Book, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
1, 2008, at A17. 
 3. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., In Pursuit of a Press Privilege, 11 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 233–
34 (1974). 
 4. Ex Parte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471 (C.C.D.C. 1848). 
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to reveal to a House select committee the identities of members who 
revealed names of colleagues taking bribes.5  As long as there have 
been reporters who have relied upon confidential sources for their 
stories, subpoenas have been used to try to get reporters to reveal 
them. 
For a long time, the press relied solely upon the Constitution to 
resist the subpoenas.  The First Amendment certainly seemed to 
support that reliance, prohibiting Congress—and the States by 
incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment6—from 
“abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”7  However, the 
Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Branzburg v. Hayes8 marked a 
significant setback to that strategy.  In a fractured decision, a plurality 
found that a journalist’s shield did not exist, while at the same time 
five Justices concluded that the First Amendment provided the press 
with at least some protection.9
Afterward, federal courts tried to reconcile the conflicting opinions 
when they were confronted with requests to subpoena journalists.10  
Similarly, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia used court 
decisions, statutes, or both, in an effort to provide judges with 
guidance on how to handle requests to compel identification of a 
journalist’s source.11  The result is a hodge-podge of inconsistent rules 
that vary from state to state and from federal circuit to federal 
circuit.12
Today, there is growing support to remedy the problem through a 
federal shield law.  In October 2007, the House of Representatives 
approved H.R. 2102, the Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, by the 
overwhelming margin of 398 to 21.13  A companion Senate bill,  
S. 2035, was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee that 
same month by a vote of fifteen to four.14  Passage of a shield law 
 5. 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 5426 (1980). 
 6. See generally Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (incorporating 
freedom of the press); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (incorporating 
freedom of speech). 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 8. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
 10. See infra Part II.C.3. 
 11. See infra notes 76–83 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 13. H.R. 2102, 110th Cong., 153 CONG. REC. H11, 602 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2007). 
 14. Michael A. Chihak, Sen. Secrecy, aka Jon Kyl, Blocks Free Flow of Info, TUCSON 
CITIZEN, Oct. 13, 2007, available at http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/altss/ 
printstory/opinion/65735.  The Committee vote in favor of S. 2035 originally was 
fifteen to two.  Keith Perrine, Legislation Advances to Protect Confidentiality of Reporters’ 
Sources, CONG. Q. WKLY., Oct. 6, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 20161187.  However, 
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seems inevitable.  At the same time, the Bush Administration and 
many federal prosecutors remain opposed to the federal shield bills.  
Professor Steven Clymer and Professor Randall Eliason, current and 
former federal prosecutors who testified during congressional 
hearings,15 ably summarized some of the reasons for that opposition 
in their remarks during the Symposium. 
This Article responds to Professors Clymer and Eliason.  Part I 
begins by briefly explaining the role of the press in our republic and 
why the First Amendment protects it.  Part II examines the Branzburg 
decision and efforts to enact shield legislation in its aftermath.  Part 
III describes the key provisions of H.R. 2102 and explores how the 
bill evolved to address criticism of the legislation’s opponents.  Part 
IV summarizes the arguments made by Professors Clymer and Eliason 
and explains why the public interest outweighs their concerns, to the 
extent that some have merit.  The need for a shield law is real, and 
H.R. 2102 strikes the right balance between the free flow of 
information and other competing interests. 
I. PROMOTING AN INFORMED ELECTORATE THROUGH A FREE PRESS 
In 1786, Thomas Jefferson wrote to John Jay, “our liberty . . . 
cannot be guarded but by the freedom of the press, nor that be 
limited without danger of losing it.”16  Those oft-quoted words explain 
why freedom of the press is a cornerstone of our republic.17  
Constitutional protection of the press, through the First Amendment, 
is not an end in itself.  Rather, it is deeply rooted in the press’s 
Senator Sessions of Alabama and Senator Coburn of Oklahoma later changed their 
votes from “pass” to “no.”  See Chihak, supra.
 15. See Free Flow of Information Act of 2007:  Hearing on H.R. 2102 Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 52–63 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2102] 
(testimony of Randall Eliason, Professor, George Washington University Law 
School); Reporters’ Privilege Legislation:  Preserving Effective Federal Law Enforcement:  
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 16–18 (2006) [hereinafter 
Senate Hearing] (statement of Steven Clymer, Professor, Cornell Law School); 
 16. Thomas Jefferson, To John Jay, in THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 73 (Paul 
Leicester Ford ed., 1904), available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/files/802/0054-
05_Bk.pdf. 
 17. Experience has shown what could happen without a free press.  In 1734, the 
Royal Governor of New York indicted and jailed John Peter Zenger, the publisher of 
the New York Weekly Journal, for seditious libel.  Zenger was charged with printing 
unsigned columns endorsing a legislative candidate critical of the governor.  His 
acquittal in 1735 laid the foundation for the sweeping protections of the press in the 
First Amendment.  See generally LIVINGSTON RUTHERFURD, JOHN PETER ZENGER:  HIS 
PRESS, HIS TRIAL AND A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ZENGER IMPRINTS (Dogg, Mead & Co. 1904), 
for an account of Zenger’s trial and its ramifications. 
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unique role in promoting speech and self-governance for all 
Americans.18
The press accomplishes its purpose in several ways.  It 
communicates information essential to the discovery of truth in the 
marketplace of ideas19 and to the advancement of innovation.20  
Reporters facilitate sweeping social changes by bringing matters into 
the public consciousness, as the civil rights movement proved.  The 
press can unite us in the defense of shared principles.  Conversely, it 
can provoke incisive debates on issues that divide us, such as the Iraq 
War. 
A free press provides us with the means to maintain our republican 
form of government.21  The press “is one of the greatest Bulwarks of 
Liberty”22 because it keeps the government in check.23  As David 
Hume explained: 
 [A]rbitrary power would steal in upon us were we not careful to 
prevent its progress and were there not an easy method of 
conveying the alarm from one end of the [country] to the 
other . . . .  Nothing so effectual to this purpose as the liberty of the 
press, by which all that learning, wit, and genius of the nation may 
be employed on the side of freedom and everyone be animated to 
its defense.  As long, therefore, as the republican part of our 
 18. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967) (“Those [constitutional] 
guarantees are not for the benefit of the press so much as for the benefit of all of 
us.”). 
 19. The “marketplace of ideas” is grounded in the belief that speech must be 
protected as a fundamental right for the discovery of truth.  JOHN STUART MILL, ON 
LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 58–59 (Oxford Univ. Press 1991) 1859.  Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes eloquently invoked the metaphor by observing: 
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may 
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their 
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in 
ideas—that the basic test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground 
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 20. See FIRST CONT’L CONG., ADDRESS TO THE INHABITANTS OF THE PROVINCE OF 
QUEBEC 1774, reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY 223 (1971) (“The importance of this [freedom of the press] consists, besides 
the advancement of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of 
liberal sentiments on the administration of Government, its ready communication of 
thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, 
whereby oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated into more honourable and 
just modes of conducting affairs.”). 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 22. VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 12 (1776), reprinted in WE THE STATES:  AN 
ANTHOLOGY OF HISTORIC DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARIES THEREON, EXPOUNDING THE 
STATE AND FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP, at 4 (William Byrd Press, Inc. 1964). 
 23. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 527 (1977). 
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government can maintain itself . . . it will naturally be careful to 
keep the press open, as of importance to its own preservation.24
To ensure this role is fulfilled, the First Amendment guarantees the 
press the right to be free from prior restraints by the government.25  
Without those guarantees, the press would be subjected to censorship 
“as had been practiced by other governments.”26
The press likewise provides the tools necessary for self-governance. 
“Under a representative system of government, an informed 
electorate is a precondition of responsive decision-making.”27  That 
cannot be achieved without aggressive news reporting: 
 [I]n a society in which each individual has but limited time and 
resources with which to observe at first hand the operations of his 
government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in 
convenient form the facts of those operations . . . .  Without the 
information provided by the press most of us and many of our 
representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register 
opinions on the administration of government generally.28
In other words, “the First Amendment goes beyond protection of 
the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit 
government from limiting the stock of information from which 
members of the public may draw.”29  The press must have the ability 
to gather that information free of government interference.30
 
 24. DAVID HUME, OF THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS (1742), reprinted in 5 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, at 117 (Philip B. Kurlan & Ralph Lerner ed., Univ. of Chi. 
Press 1987). 
 25. See generally Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451–52 (1938) (“The 
struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the power of the 
licensor. . . .  [T]his freedom from previous restraint upon publication . . . was a 
leading purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provision.”). 
 26. Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); see 
Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1974) (White, J., 
concurring) (“We have learned, and continue to learn, from what we view as the 
unhappy experiences of other nations where government has been allowed to 
meddle in the internal editorial affairs of newspapers.”). 
 27. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 203 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 28. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491–92 (1975); see Pell v. Procunier, 
417 U.S. 817, 832 (1974) (“The constitutional guarantee of a free press . . . secures 
‘the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people 
concerning public officials.’” (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 
(1964))); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (“The predominant 
purpose of the grant of immunity here invoked was to preserve an untrammeled 
press as a vital source of public information.”). 
 29. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); see Kleindienst 
v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (referring “to a First Amendment right to 
‘receive information and ideas’”). 
 30. See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (observing that 
“without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be 
eviscerated”). 
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Armed with a free press, Americans can make informed decisions 
as “the final judge of the proper conduct of public business.”31  It 
further allows “debate on public issues” to remain “uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open.”32  In the process, freedom of the press 
facilitates “the instrumental means required in order that the 
citizenry exercise that ultimate sovereignty reposed in its collective 
judgment by the Constitution.”33
II. THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL SHIELD LAW:  BRANZBURG AND ITS 
AFTERMATH 
Government officials often have challenged the press in its 
reporting, particularly when news accounts from confidential sources 
reveal embarrassing or illegal activities.  The absence of a common 
law reporters’ privilege fueled the use of subpoenas to identify those 
sources. 
An 1897 case illustrates how the judiciary frequently responded.  
The court compelled an editor and a reporter to disclose their 
sources after they published a story that state senate members had 
been bribed.34  In upholding the order, the California Supreme Court 
found that “[i]t cannot be successfully contended, and has not been 
seriously argued, that the witnesses were justified in refusing to give 
these names upon the ground that the communication was 
privileged.”35  Other courts agreed that there was no common law 
privilege for journalists to refrain from judicial orders to reveal their 
sources.36
As the use of subpoenas increased, it became evident that some 
action had to be taken.  In 1896, the Maryland legislature enacted a 
testimonial privilege for reporters under state law.37  Sixteen 
additional states followed suit.38  In 1970, the U.S. Department of 
 31. Cox, 420 U.S. at 495. 
 32. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 33. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 408, 471 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 34. Ex parte Lawrence, 48 P. 124, 125 (Cal. 1897). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir. 1958) (noting the absence of 
a judicially recognized reporters’ privilege), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); People 
ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of N.Y. County, 199 N.E. 415, 416 (N.Y. 1936) (declining to 
“depart from the general rule in force in many of the states and in England and 
create a privilege in favor of an additional class” by reasoning it was a matter for the 
legislature). 
 37. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 2 (1896) (repealed 1973); Branzburg v. Haynes, 408 
U.S. 665, 699 n.37 (1972). 
 38. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690 n.27 (collecting citations of state statutes that 
provide some level of protection to a reporter’s confidential sources). 
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Justice implemented procedures for issuing subpoenas to the press.  
The guidelines recognized “that compulsory process in some 
circumstances may have a limiting effect on the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.”39
Against that backdrop, the Supreme Court decided Branzburg, 
addressing whether there was a journalist’s privilege under the First 
Amendment.  Unfortunately, the plurality and concurring opinions 
raised more questions than they answered.  Following the divided 
Court’s decision, a host of different approaches were adopted at the 
state and federal levels.  What has resulted is a lack of uniformity and 
uncertainty that can lead to different results for the same set of facts, 
dependent entirely upon the court in which a subpoena is requested.  
This Part explores the problems posed by Branzburg that necessitate 
passage of a federal shield law. 
A. The Branzburg Decision 
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court addressed four cases in which 
subpoenas required journalists to appear before a grand jury to 
identify a confidential source.40  The lower courts split on whether the 
reporters could be compelled to testify before a grand jury.  In one 
case, the court rejected a reporters’ privilege under Massachusetts 
law.41  In two cases brought against Paul Branzburg, the courts held 
that a Kentucky privilege did not apply because it “did not permit a 
reporter to refuse to testify about events he had observed personally, 
including the identities of those persons he had observed.”42
On the other hand, in the fourth case the Ninth Circuit found the 
reporter had a qualified privilege to withhold testimony about his 
confidential source.43  The court reasoned that “the public’s First 
Amendment right to be informed would be jeopardized by requiring 
a journalist to submit to secret Grand Jury interrogation.”44  The court 
held that to overcome the privilege, the government must 
 39. Id. at 707 n.41 (quoting Memorandum No. 692 from Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 2, 
1970)). The Guidelines required that “all reasonable attempts should be made to 
obtain information from non-press sources” and negotiation with the press before 
relying on judicial process.  Id.  In most cases, the Attorney General could authorize 
a press subpoena only if there was “sufficient reason to believe that the information 
sought . . . [was] essential to a successful investigation” and it was otherwise 
unavailable. Id. 
 40. Id. at 667. 
 41. In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297, 302–03 (Mass. 1971), aff’d, Branzburg, 408 U.S. 
665. 
 42. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 669. 
 43. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1089–90 (9th Cir. 1970), rev’d, 
Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665. 
 44. Id. at 1089. 
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demonstrate “a compelling need for the witness’s presence before 
judicial process properly can issue to require attendance.”45
Writing for a plurality in Branzburg, Justice White disagreed.  He 
acknowledged that “some protection for seeking out the news” was 
necessary to prevent the press from being “eviscerated.”46  However, 
he found that none of the four cases restricted the ability of the 
reporters to investigate and publish their stories.47  Instead, Justice 
White concluded that journalists were not immune “from disclosing 
to a grand jury information . . . received in confidence” any more 
than other citizens.48  According to Justice White, the only exception 
was grand jury investigations “instituted or conducted other than in 
good faith.”49  In addition, Congress and the state legislatures 
remained free “to determine whether a statutory newsman’s privilege 
is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules as 
narrow or broad as . . . necessary.”50
Justice Powell wrote a separate concurring opinion aptly described 
by Justice Stewart as “enigmatic.”51  In it, he noted that reporters who 
were subpoenaed are not “without constitutional rights with respect 
to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their sources.”52  
According to Justice Powell, a remedy existed for a journalist who was 
the target of a bad faith grand jury investigation.  The journalist 
could assert a privilege that was to “be judged on its facts by the 
striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the 
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to 
criminal conduct.”53  Rather than providing specific guidance, Justice 
Powell concluded the balance could be achieved “on a case-by-case 
basis” consistent “with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating 
such questions.”54
Four Justices dissented.55  Justice Douglas concluded that 
journalists had an absolute privilege under the First Amendment to 
keep their sources confidential.  He reasoned that “there is no 
‘compelling need’ that can be shown which qualifies the reporter’s 
 45. Id. 
 46. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681. 
 47. Id. at 681–82. 
 48. Id. at 682–83. 
 49. Id. at 707. 
 50. Id. at 706. 
 51. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 52. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 53. Id. at 710. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Brennan and 
Justice Marshall joined.  See id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also id. at 711 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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immunity from appearing or testifying before a grand jury, unless the 
reporter himself is implicated in a crime.”56  As a result, “a newsman 
has an absolute right not to appear before a grand jury.”57  According 
to Justice Douglas, this privilege was not lost even if the journalist 
voluntarily appeared before a grand jury.58
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, argued 
that the plurality invited “authorities to undermine the historic 
independence of the press by attempting to annex the journalistic 
profession as an investigative arm of government.”59  He further 
observed that “informants are necessary to the news-gathering 
process” and “the free flow of information to the public.”60  
Confidentiality played a key role in securing those informants.  
Without that protection, a potential source would have to “choose 
between risking exposure by giving information or avoiding the risk 
by remaining silent.”61  Justice Stewart reasoned that “unchecked 
power” by the government to compel disclosure of confidences would 
deter sources “from giving information, and reporters will clearly be 
deterred from publishing it.”62  That was particularly true for details 
derived from “relationships involving sensitive and controversial 
matters.”63
As a result, Justice Stewart found that reporters had a qualified 
privilege under the First Amendment.  He proposed a three-part test 
to balance “the public interest in the administration of justice and the 
constitutional protection of the full flow of information.”64  To 
overcome the reporters’ privilege, the government would have to 
show:  (1) probable cause that the information sought is relevant to a 
criminal matter, (2) the information “cannot be obtained by 
alternate means less destructive of First Amendment rights,” and (3) 
a “compelling and overriding interest in the information.”65  The test 
would not be triggered until a reporter moved to quash a subpoena, 
“asserting the basis on which he considered the particular 
relationship a confidential one.”66  Justice Stewart conceded that 
 56. Id. at 712. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 712–13. 
 59. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. at 729, 738. 
 61. Id. at 731. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 735–36. 
 64. Id. at 745. 
 65. Id. at 743.  Justice Stewart’s test is similar to one proposed by the reporter in 
Caldwell.  Compare id., with Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081, 1090 n.10 (9th 
Cir. 1970), rev’d, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 66. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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“courts would be required to make some delicate judgments . . . .  But 
that, after all, is the function of courts of law.”67
Taken together, the Branzburg opinions provide little guidance.  All 
nine Justices agreed that journalists were protected from bad faith 
grand jury investigations, but a majority did not identify what 
constituted “bad faith.”  Eight Justices rejected an absolute 
journalist’s privilege under the First Amendment; conversely, at least 
five Justices—Justice Powell and the four dissenting Justices—agreed 
that journalists had at least some First Amendment protections to 
refrain from identifying a confidential source.  Led by Justice Stewart, 
three Justices proposed a balancing test to weigh the competing 
interests implicated by a subpoena to the press; however, a four 
Justice plurality declined to adopt a specific test, choosing instead to 
defer to Congress and the states.  Legislative efforts to respond to 
Branzburg’s fractured opinion soon followed. 
B. State Responses to Branzburg and Nixon’s Abuse of Power 
Growing evidence of governmental abuses of power coincided with 
the Branzburg decision.  In 1971, the Supreme Court rejected the 
Nixon Administration’s efforts to enjoin publication of the Pentagon 
Papers, which confidential source Daniel Ellsberg, a State 
Department official, leaked to the New York Times and Washington 
Post.68  The Pentagon Papers detailed President Lyndon Johnson’s 
escalation of the Vietnam War while he was promising the public not 
to expand it.69  Following publication of the Pentagon Papers, 
Ellsberg went into hiding.  After the FBI identified Ellsberg as the 
source, President Nixon campaigned to discredit him.  With Nixon’s 
knowledge, the “White House plumbers” broke into Ellsberg’s 
psychiatrist’s office in an unsuccessful effort to locate Ellsberg’s 
medical records.70
In 1973, the Watergate scandal broke wide open because of a 
confidential source, W. Mark Felt.  Felt, also known as “Deep Throat,” 
was the second highest official in the FBI.  His revelations to 
Washington Post journalists Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein linked 
President Nixon directly to two crimes:  the plumbers’ 1971 break-in 
of Ellsberg’s psychiatrist’s office and the June 1972 burglary of the 
 67. Id. at 745–46. 
 68. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 713–14 (1971). 
 69. THE PENTAGON PAPERS:  ABRIDGED EDITION 157–58 (George C. Herring ed., 
1993). 
 70. DANIEL ELLSBERG, SECRETS:  A MEMOIR OF VIETNAM AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS 
439–41 (2002). 
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Democratic National Committee headquarters.71  Following news 
reports of Felt’s disclosures, a federal investigation of Nixon was 
opened, despite Nixon’s efforts to withhold and destroy evidence.72  
According to Bernstein, Felt would not have revealed that 
information without the promise of confidentiality,73 which would 
have doomed the case against Nixon.74  Felt’s identity remained secret 
for over thirty years, until he voluntarily came forward in 2005.75
Nixon’s abuse of power, combined with Branzburg, spurred the 
states to take action.  After Branzburg, sixteen state legislatures 
accepted Justice Stewart’s invitation to adopt a statutory reporters’ 
privilege.  Today, more than thirty-three states and the District of 
Columbia have enacted legislation to protect the confidential 
relationship between reporters and their sources.76  All state shield 
laws provide journalists at least some relief from judicial subpoenas 
directed at obtaining the identity of confidential sources.77  
Approximately two-thirds of those laws also protect certain 
unpublished and non-confidential information.78
A growing number of state courts have recognized a reporters’ 
privilege under state law or through their interpretations of the First 
Amendment or the state constitutional counterpart.  Sixteen of the 
seventeen states without shield laws have provided at least some relief 
to journalists seeking to protect confidential sources.79  Courts in ten 
of those states have expressly found some form of reporters’ privilege 
 71. David Von Drehle, FBI’s No. 2 was “Deep Throat”, WASH. POST, June 1, 2005, at 
A1. 
 72. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714 (1974) (ordering President 
Nixon to produce the subpoenaed White House tapes). 
 73. Affidavit of Carl Bernstein in Support of the Motion to Quash Subpoenas by 
Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams ¶ 5, In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 438 F. 
Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. CR 06-90225 JSW). 
 74. See generally WASH. POST, THE FALL OF A PRESIDENT (1974) (describing the 
investigation and impeachment proceedings that resulted from Woodward and 
Bernstein’s reports of Felt’s disclosures). 
 75. See Von Drehle, supra note 71. 
 76. See HENRY COHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., JOURNALISTS’ PRIVILEGE TO 
WITHHOLD INFORMATION IN JUDICIAL AND OTHER PROCEEDINGS:  STATE SHIELD STATUTES 
1 (2007).  See generally id. at 3–47 (providing the text of the statutory reporters’ shield 
laws).  
 77. Id. at 1–2. 
 78. Id. 
 79. No courts in Wyoming have addressed whether a reporters’ privilege exists 
under state law.  See id. at 1; see also Lucy Dalglish, Executive Dir., Reporters Comm. 
for Freedom of the Press, Remarks at the American University Law Review 
Symposium:  Left Out in the Cold?  The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the 
Press in Post-9/11 America (Sept. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Dalglish Remarks], video 
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/symposia.cfm#. 
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under applicable state law.80  The remaining six states have limited 
protection for journalists with some courts in those states recognizing 
the privilege81 and others rejecting it.82  The result is that reporters’ 
shield protections vary considerably from state to state.83
C. The Hodge-Podge of Federal Responses to Branzburg 
The variance among some state reporters’ shield provisions is 
nothing compared to the hodge-podge of federal protection.  There 
are statutory, executive, and judicial sources for a federal shield.  
However, all fall far short of the meaningful journalists’ privilege 
needed to maintain the free flow of information to the public. 
1. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 does not recognize a common law shield 
 
In 1974, Congress enacted Federal Rule of Evidence 501 to define 
the scope of testimonial privileges in federal civil and criminal cases.  
Rule 501 provides that except as otherwise required by the 
Constitution, Congress, or Supreme Court, “the privilege of a 
 80. In re Contempt of Wright, 700 P.2d 40, 45 (Idaho 1985); Waterloo/Cedar 
Falls Courier v. Hawkeye Cmty. Coll., 646 N.W.2d 97, 101 (Iowa 2002); State v. 
Sandstrom, 581 P.2d 812, 814 (Kan. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979); In re 
John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 574 N.E.2d 373, 375 (Mass. 1991); State ex rel. 
Classic III, Inc. v. Ely, 954 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Siel, 444 A.2d 
499, 502–03 (N.H. 1982); Hopewell v. Midcontinent Broad. Corp., 538 N.W.2d 780, 
781–82 (S.D. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 817 (1996); State v. St. Peter, 315 A.2d 254, 
256 (Vt. 1974); Brown v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431 (Va. 1974), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 966 (1974); State ex rel. Green Bay Newspaper Co. v. Circuit Court, 335 
N.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Wisc. 1983). 
 81. The six states in which some courts have recognized a reporters’ privilege are 
Hawaii, Maine, Mississippi, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia.  See Brinston v. Dunn, 
919 F. Supp. 240, 243–44 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (concluding that reporters have a 
qualified privilege); Bottomly v. Leucadia Nat’l Corp., No. 94-C-590 B, 1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14760, at *4–5 (D. Utah July 2, 1996) (quashing a subpoena of a reporter 
based upon a qualified privilege); DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 507 F. Supp. 880, 886 
(D. Haw. 1981) (recognizing a conditional reporters’ privilege of nondisclosure but 
finding it was not met); In re Denis Letellier, 578 A.2d 722, 726–27 (Me. 1990) 
(adopting the balancing test used by the First Circuit); Dallas Morning News Co. v. 
Garcia, 822 S.W.2d 675, 681–85 (Tex. App. 1991) (applying a qualified privilege 
through a balancing test); State ex rel. Hudok v. Henry, 389 S.E.2d 188, 194 (W. Va. 
1989) (recognizing a qualified reporters’ privilege). 
 82. See In re Goodfader, 367 P.2d 472, 482 (Haw. 1961) (pre-Branzburg decision 
finding that reporters do not have a privilege to withhold confidential sources); In re 
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 6 S.W.3d 310, 312 (Tex. App. 1999) (rejecting a reporters’ 
privilege to non-confidential information and reserving judgment on confidential 
sources). 
 83. For additional discussion of the inconsistent protections afforded by states to 
journalists seeking to withhold confidential sources, see generally Laurence B. 
Alexander & Ellen M. Bush, Shield Laws on Trial:  State Court Interpretation of the 
Journalist’s Statutory Privilege, 23 J. LEGIS. 215 (1997), and Anthony L. Fargo, The 
Journalist’s Privilege for Nonconfidential Information in States Without Shield Laws, 7 COMM. 
L. & POL’Y 241 (2002). 
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witness . . . shall be governed by the principles of the common law as 
they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light 
of reason and experience.”84
Congress considered adopting a rule that would have listed and 
defined the specific privileges recognized in Rule 501,85 but 
widespread disagreement resulted in language permitting the 
continued “evolutionary development of testimonial privileges.”86  
Rule 501 does not “freeze the law governing the privileges of 
witnesses”87 and is meant to adapt “itself to varying conditions.”88  In 
practice, Federal Rule of Evidence 501 has proven ineffective to 
provide meaningful protection for journalists in much of the nation. 
Despite nearly universal recognition of a reporters’ privilege by the 
states, federal acceptance of common law protection has lagged far 
behind.  No federal circuit has adopted the absolute privilege 
advanced by Justice Douglas in Branzburg.  Where the privilege does 
exist, there is general agreement that in some cases other important 
public interests override the privilege.  Use of a balancing test is 
commonplace to resolve the issue. 
2. Department of Justice regulations are inadequate 
The current Department of Justice regulations are less protective 
than those in place when Branzburg was decided.89  The Department’s 
expressed policy is to ensure “the prosecutorial power of the 
government” is not “used in such a way that it impairs a reporter’s 
responsibility to cover as broadly as possible controversial public 
issues.”90  Before the Department may subpoena a reporter, “[a]ll 
reasonable attempts should be made to obtain information from 
alternative sources.”91  In addition, the Department claims to pursue 
negotiations with the media “in all cases” in which a subpoena to a 
reporter is contemplated.92  Where appropriate, “the government 
should make clear what its needs are . . . as well as its willingness to 
respond to particular problems of the media.”93
 84. FED. R. EVID. 501. 
 85. S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 6 (1974). 
 86. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980). 
 87. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996). 
 88. Id. at 8 (quoting Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933)). 
 89. Compare 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (2007) (current Dep’t of Justice guidelines), with 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 n.41 (1972) (describing Dep’t of Justice 
guidelines in effect when Branzburg was decided). 
 90. 28 C.F.R. § 50.10. 
 91. Id. § 50.10(b). 
 92. Id. § 50.10(c).  Certain exceptions apply for subpoenas of reporters’ 
telephone records.  Id. § 50.10(d). 
 93. Id. § 50.10(c). 
  
2008] ENACTING A REASONABLE FEDERAL SHIELD LAW 1305 
                                                          
If the Justice Department decides to subpoena a reporter, the 
regulations describe the process that should be followed.  The 
requesting attorney is asked to show, among other things:  the 
information is “essential” to a criminal or civil case; it is unavailable 
from other non-media sources; it is limited to published information 
and associated information except in “exigent circumstances;” and 
the request is carefully treated “to avoid claims of harassment.”94  The 
Attorney General must approve all Justice Department subpoenas of 
reporters.95  In making that determination, the Attorney General is 
supposed to “strike the proper balance between the public’s interest 
in the free dissemination of ideas and information and the public’s 
interest in effective law enforcement and the fair administration of 
justice.”96
Protection for journalists under the Justice Department regulations 
is illusory.  The Attorney General exercises unfettered discretion in 
issuing subpoenas under Department rules.  As the United States 
Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted in the 
Judith Miller case, “the guidelines provide no enforceable rights to 
any individuals, but merely guide the discretion of the prosecutors.”97  
There is no judicial oversight to determine whether the Attorney 
General is applying the regulations properly, or even applying them 
at all. 
As a result of the Attorney General’s discretion, the Department 
can construe “avoid[ing] the loss of life or the compromise of a 
security interest”98 as justifying sweeping subpoenas of the press.  For 
example, the Department subpoenaed Lance Williams and Mark 
Fainaru-Wada, two San Francisco Chronicle reporters who exposed the 
steroid scandal surrounding the Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative 
(“BALCO”).  The purpose of the subpoena was to compel the 
reporters to disclose the identity of the confidential source who 
supplied secret grand jury testimony about BALCO.99
However, Mark Corallo, former press secretary for Attorney 
General John Ashcroft, requested that the court reject the 
Department’s request for a subpoena.  Corallo explained: 
 94. Id. § 50.10(f). 
 95. Id. § 50.10(e). 
 96. Id. § 50.10(a). 
 97. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 438 F.3d 1141, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 98. 3 THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-13.400 (Supp. 2007) (titled “News 
Media Subpoenas—Subpoenas for News Media Telephone Toll Records—
Interrogation, Indictment, or Arrest of Members of the News Media”). 
 99. Elizabeth Fernandez & Suzanne Herel, U.S. Orders Chronicle Reporters to Testify, 
S.F. CHRON., May 6, 2006, at A1. 
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I do not believe that [the subpoenas] would have been issued 
under former Attorney General Ashcroft’s administration.  In this 
case, there is no danger to life or issue of grave national security.  
There are, however, issues of immense national importance that 
were brought to light by the reporting of Mr. Fainaru-Wada and 
Mr. Williams.100
Corallo later called the Department’s request “the most reckless 
abuse of power I have seen in years.”101
The BALCO subpoenas illustrate the dangers to a free press that 
are posed by the Justice Department’s regulations.  The sanctions 
that Fainaru-Wada and Williams received, up to eighteen months in 
prison for civil contempt,102 were more than twice as long as the 
sentences of BALCO ringleader Victor Conte and the four other 
convicted defendants.103  The subpoenas also were unnecessary.  
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales argued, “[w]e . . . can’t have a 
situation where someone who does a terrible crime can’t be 
prosecuted because of information that’s in the hands of the 
reporter.”104  However, Gonzales’s statement proved untrue.  The 
confidential source, a criminal defense attorney whom the 
Department believed to be the leak long before the reporters were 
subpoenaed, voluntarily came forward.105
Additionally, the regulations do not even apply to all of the 
Department’s cases.  As Lucy Dalglish noted, special prosecutors are 
not subject to the regulations.106  Many of the most widely reported 
cases of press subpoenas involved special prosecutors.107  Although it 
is possible that individual special prosecutors may choose to follow 
the Justice Department regulations, they are under no obligation to 
do so.  Like the Attorney General, a special prosecutor who 
 100. Affidavit of Mark Corallo in Support of the Motion to Quash Subpoenas 
and/or for a Protective Order by Mark Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams ¶ 10, In re 
Grand Jury Subpoenas, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. CR 06-90225 
JSW). 
 101. Liz Halloran & Scott Michels, Curbing the Press, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 
12, 2006, at 29, 30. 
 102. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, No. CR 06-90225(JSW), 2006 WL 2734275, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2006). 
 103. Victor Conte, the President of BALCO, received the harshest sentence of all 
of those found guilty in the BALCO scandal.  His sentence was four months in prison 
and four months home detention.  Mark Fainaru-Wada & Lance Williams, BALCO’s 
Conte, Barry Bonds’ Trainer Sentenced, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 18, 2005, at A1. 
 104. Zachary Coile, Gonzales Defends Move Against BALCO Reporters, S.F. CHRON., 
May 20, 2006, at A3. 
 105. Bob Egelko, Lawyer Admits Leaking BALCO Testimony, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 14, 
2007, at A1. 
 106. Dalglish Remarks, supra note 79. 
 107. Id. 
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voluntarily applies the regulations is not subject to any oversight to 
monitor whether they have done so properly. 
Moreover, the regulations “do not apply to civil litigants in federal 
court.”108  The number of journalists subpoenaed in civil cases 
brought in federal court is burgeoning,109 as Professor Clymer ably 
pointed out in citing the Wen Ho Lee and Steven Hatfill libel cases.110  
Yet, even the voluntary guidelines that can be applied at the attorney 
general’s discretion are unavailable.  Courts end up caught in the 
middle between dueling civil litigants, bereft of any guidance.  The 
resulting “lack of uniformity” undercuts state privileges, “‘causes 
needless confusion,’” and undermines the administration of justice.111
Determination of whether a journalist is compelled to identify his 
or her source should be the product of a single set of judicially 
enforceable standards, and not the forum shopping that results from 
discretionary Justice Department regulations inapplicable to an 
entire class of cases. 
3. Federal courts are divided over the journalist shield’s scope 
The level of protection for journalists in civil cases differs 
considerably among the federal circuit courts of appeal.  Three 
circuit courts have failed to adopt a reporters’ privilege in civil 
matters.  The Sixth Circuit has expressly rejected the privilege.112  The 
Seventh and Eighth Circuits have not addressed the issue,113 although 
some lower courts have recognized a qualified privilege in civil 
cases.114  In contrast, most circuits recognize a qualified privilege to 
withhold confidential information in civil cases by applying a 
balancing test similar to Justice Stewart’s.115
 108. 153 CONG. REC. H11, 599 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2007) (statement of Rep. Holt). 
 109. Hearing on H.R. 2102, supra note 15, at 32 (testimony of Lee Levine, Partner, 
Levine, Sullivan, Koch & Schulz). 
 110. Professor Steven Clymer, Remarks at the American University Law Review 
Symposium:  Left Out in the Cold?  The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the 
Press in Post-9/11 America (Sept. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Clymer Remarks], video 
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/symposia.cfm#. 
 111. H.R. REP. NO. 110-370, at 6–8 (2007). 
 112. Storer Commc’ns, Inc. v. Giovan (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 
580, 583–84 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 113. See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 531–32 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 918 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 
1105 (1997). 
 114. E.g., Warnell v. Ford Motor Co., 183 F.R.D. 624, 625 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Warzon 
v. Drew, 155 F.R.D. 183, 187 (E.D. Wis. 1994); May v. Collins, 122 F.R.D 535, 540 
(S.D. Ind. 1988); Cont’l Cablevision, Inc. v. Storer Broad. Co., 583 F. Supp. 427, 437–
38 (E.D. Mo. 1984). 
 115. E.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 169–74 (2d Cir. 2006); In re 
Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 2004); In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 
128–29 (3d Cir. 1998); Church of Scientology Int’l v. Daniels, 992 F.2d 1329, 1335 
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Some federal circuits have gone further, applying the qualified 
privilege to non-confidential information or sources in civil cases.116  
The Fourth Circuit has not addressed the issue conclusively,117 while 
the Fifth Circuit has declined to protect non-confidential 
information.118  Lower courts in the Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. 
Circuits have applied the privilege to non-confidential sources or 
information.119  Protection is extended to non-confidential 
information because there is “a lurking and subtle threat to 
journalists and their employers if disclosure of outtakes, notes, and 
other unused information, even if nonconfidential, becomes routine 
and casually, if not cavalierly, compelled.”120  Some circuits apply the 
same balancing test they use for confidential information.121  Other 
circuits apply a lower threshold for civil litigants seeking non-
confidential information than what is required to obtain confidential 
information.122
Only a handful of federal circuits (the First, Second, Third, and 
Eleventh) have recognized a qualified reporter’s privilege in criminal 
cases.123  The Fourth Circuit has followed Justice Powell’s opinion in 
(4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 869 (1993); Scarce v. United States (In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings), 5 F.3d 397, 402–03 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1041 
(1994); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
482 U.S. 917 (1987); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Miller v. 
Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
1041 (1981); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436–37 (10th Cir. 1977). 
 116. E.g., Gonzales v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29, 31–32 (2d Cir. 1999); Shoen v. 
Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1294–95 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 
841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Cuthbertson (Cuthbertson I), 630 
F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981). 
 117. The Fourth Circuit has protected some non-confidential information in civil 
cases in limited circumstances.  Church of Scientology Int’l, 992 F.2d at 1335.  Lower 
courts have reached different results on the issue because of the ambiguity of the 
Fourth Circuit rule.  Compare United States v. King, 194 F.R.D. 569, 582–85 (E.D. Va. 
2000) (concluding there is no privilege absent confidentiality or harassment by the 
requesting party), with, Penland v. Long, 922 F. Supp. 1080, 1083–84 (W.D.N.C. 
1995) (applying a qualified privilege for non-confidential information). 
 118. United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 972–73 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 119. E.g., Hutira v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 211 F. Supp. 2d 115, 121 (D.D.C. 2002); 
United States v. Foote, 30 Media L. Rep. 2469, 2471–72 (D. Kan. 2002); United States 
v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp. 295, 297 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff’d, 730 F.2d 1425 (11th Cir. 
1984). 
 120. Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting 
LaRouche, 841 F.2d at 1182).  The federal government’s efforts to coerce disclosure 
of freelance videographer Josh Wolf’s outtakes highlight the need for protection.  
Henry K. Lee, Appeals Panel Sends Journalist Back to Prison, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 23, 2006, 
at B5. 
 121. Mark v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412, 416–18 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Cuthbertson (Cuthbertson II), 651 F.2d 189, 195–96 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 1056 (1981). 
 122. Smith, 135 F.3d at 972–73. 
 123. E.g., In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44–45 (1st Cir. 2004); United 
States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 917 
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Branzburg by limiting the privilege to cases of government harassment 
or bad faith.124  New York Times reporter Judith Miller unsuccessfully 
attempted to assert the privilege in the grand jury investigation into 
leaks of CIA official Valerie Plame’s identity.  The D.C. Circuit 
summarized the majority rule in rejecting her claim in the In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena decision: 
Unquestionably, the Supreme Court decided in Branzburg that 
there is no First Amendment privilege protecting journalists from 
appearing before a grand jury or from testifying before a grand 
jury or otherwise providing evidence to a grand jury regardless of 
any confidence promised by the reporter to any source.  The 
Highest Court has spoken and never revisited the question. 
Without doubt, that is the end of the matter.125
Where the privilege is recognized in criminal matters, it tends to be 
more narrowly applied than in civil cases because of competing Sixth 
Amendment concerns.126  In grand jury proceedings with facts similar 
to those in Branzburg, a reporter typically will not be shielded from 
being required to comply with a subpoena.127
The rift in federal courts over the reporters’ privilege is present 
even where the issue purportedly is settled, such as in In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena.  Three judges wrote concurring opinions reflecting their 
deep divisions.  Judge Sentelle rejected the privilege in grand jury 
proceedings, reasoning that “reporters . . . enjoy no common law 
privilege beyond the protection against harassing grand juries 
conducting groundless investigations that is available to all other 
citizens.”128  He further concluded that Rule 501 provided no basis to 
(1987); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 
816 (1983); United States v. Cuthbertson (Cuthbertson I), 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981). 
 124. In re Shain, 978 F.2d 850, 852 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 125. 438 F.3d 1141, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 126. Cuthbertson I, 630 F.2d at 147; see also Burke, 700 F.2d at 77 (“To be sure, a 
criminal defendant has more at stake than a civil litigant and the evidentiary needs of 
a criminal defendant may weigh more heavily in the balance.”).  As one district court 
explained, 
It is easier for a party seeking to overcome the privilege to do so in a criminal 
trial or grand jury situation, or in a civil libel case where there is a media 
defendant, than in a civil case where the reporter is a non-party. This is 
because the “paramount public interest in the maintenance of a vigorous, 
aggressive and independent press” is more likely to outweigh the duty to 
testify and the private interests in civil litigation where the reporter is a non-
party. 
Cont’l Cablevision, Inc. v. Storer Broad. Co., 583 F. Supp. 427, 433 (E.D. Mo. 1984) 
(citations omitted). 
 127. E.g., United States v. Cutler, 6 F.3d 67, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 128. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 438 F.3d at 1153 (Sentelle, J., concurring). 
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depart from Branzburg.129  Judge Tatel reached the opposite 
conclusion, finding that under Rule 501, “the consensus of forty-nine 
states plus the District of Columbia—and even the Department of 
Justice—would require us to protect reporters’ sources as a matter of 
federal common law were the leak at issue either less harmful or 
more newsworthy.”130  Judge Henderson disagreed with both of her 
colleagues, finding that while the court was not “bound by Branzburg’s 
commentary on the state of the common law in 1972,”131 Rule 501 did 
not “authorize federal courts to mint testimonial privileges for any 
group . . . that demands one.”132
The majority of states have criticized the widely divergent federal 
protections for journalists.  The attorneys general of thirty-four states 
and the District of Columbia observed, “[t]he consensus among the 
States on the reporter’s privilege issue is as universal as the federal 
courts of appeals decisions on the subject are inconsistent, uncertain 
and irreconcilable.”133  Division among the federal courts has a 
pernicious effect on the states: 
A federal policy that allows journalists to be imprisoned for 
engaging in the same conduct that these State privileges encourage 
and protect “buck[s] the clear policy of virtually all states,” and 
undermines both the purpose of the shield laws, and the policy 
determinations of the State courts and legislatures that adopted 
them.134
In other words, “[t]his increasing conflict has undercut the State 
shield laws just as much as the absence of a federal privilege.”135
III. THE FEDERAL SOLUTION:  H.R. 2102, THE FREE FLOW OF 
INFORMATION ACT OF 2007 
For over three decades, Congress considered numerous federal 
reporters’ shield bills.  In the months following Branzburg, six bills 
were introduced to adopt a shield law.  The following year, sixty-five 
more bills were introduced.136  All told, approximately one hundred 
 129. Id. at 1155–56. 
 130. Id. at 1164 (Tatel, J., concurring). 
 131. Id. at 1160 (Henderson, J., concurring). 
 132. Id. at 1161. 
 133. Brief for the States of Okla. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7, 
Miller v. United States, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005) (Nos. 04-1507 & 04-1508), 2005 WL 
1317523, at *7. 
 134. Id. at *2–3 (citation omitted). 
 135. Id. at *3. 
 136. The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, A Short History of Attempts to 
Pass a Federal Shield Law, 28 NEWS MEDIA & THE L. 9 (2004), available at 
http://www.rcfp.org/news/mag/28-4/cov-ashorthi.html [hereinafter A Short 
History]. 
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bills to create a shield law were introduced by 1978.137  None of the 
bills made it to a floor vote.  Despite the acknowledged need for 
congressional action, no federal reporters’ shield law had been 
enacted for thirty-five years after Branzburg. 
There were several reasons for congressional inaction.  Some 
resisted attempts to pass legislation because they could not agree on 
how to define who could qualify as a “journalist.”138  As Lucy Dalglish 
observed, some journalists stood on principle against early bills by 
arguing that despite Branzburg, “the First Amendment protects us.”139  
Journalists also effectively killed several bills through their division on 
the key question of whether to seek an absolute or qualified 
privilege.140  Excluding information vital to criminal defendants also 
was cited by some who opposed shield bills.141  More recently, some 
members of Congress rested their opposition to a reporters’ privilege 
on national security grounds.142
In 2007, all of those obstacles were removed in the House of 
Representatives, largely thanks to strong bipartisan efforts on both 
sides of the Hill.143  The resulting bill, H.R. 2102, the Free Flow of 
Information Act of 2007, is a product of compromise on the key 
issues that doomed earlier bills.  As a result, on October 16, 2007, the 
House enacted it by an overwhelming and veto-proof margin.144  This 
Part summarizes how the provisions of H.R. 2102 address concerns 
raised about earlier shield bills. 
A. A Functional Definition of “Journalist” 
In Branzburg, Justice White declined to recognize a reporters’ 
privilege under the First Amendment, at least in part, because of the 
 137. See Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia:  Using the Process of Journalism to 
Protect the Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 
1371, 1391–92 (2002). 
 138. See infra notes 145–151 and accompanying text. 
 139. Dalglish Remarks, supra note 79. 
 140. Id.; Berger, supra note 137, at 1391–92. 
 141. See infra note 287 and accompanying text. 
 142. See infra notes 169–170 and accompanying text. 
 143. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), and Christopher Dodd (D-
Conn.) were early leaders in the Senate, proposing a number of shield bills.  See, e.g., 
Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, S. 2035, 110th Cong. (2007) (sponsored by 
Sen. Specter); Free Flow of Information Act of 2006, S. 2831, 109th Cong. (2006) 
(sponsored by Sen. Lugar); Free Speech Protection Act of 2005, S. 369, 109th Cong. 
(2005) (sponsored by Sen. Dodd).  Representative Mike Pence (R-Ind.) introduced 
companion legislation to Senator Lugar’s shield bill in 2005, H.R. 3323, which he 
reintroduced with Representative Rick Boucher (D-Va.) as H.R. 2102 in 2007.  See 
Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. (2007) (sponsored by 
Reps. Boucher and Pence). 
 144. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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breadth of the Press Clause.  He reasoned that freedom of the press 
“is a ‘fundamental personal right’ which ‘is not confined to 
newspapers and periodicals.’”145  Instead, it also encompasses “the 
right of the lonely pamphleteer . . . just as much as . . . the large 
metropolitan publisher.”146  Information is communicated to the 
public “by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic 
researchers, and dramatists.”147  Therefore, Justice White concluded 
the Supreme Court could not draw lines consistent with the First 
Amendment where “[a]lmost any author” could make a claim to the 
need for the free flow of information by protecting their confidential 
sources.148
More recently, others expressed reservations about defining 
“journalist” in light of new technologies such as the Internet.  
Following Justice White’s reasoning in Branzburg, Judge Sentelle 
questioned whether federal courts could resolve “the difficult and 
vexing nature of this question”149 under the First Amendment: 
 [D]o we extend that protection . . . to the owner of a desktop 
printer producing a weekly newsletter . . . ? [D]oes the privilege 
also protect the proprietor of a web log:  the stereotypical “blogger” 
sitting in his pajamas at his personal computer posting on the 
World Wide Web his best product to inform whoever happens to 
browse his way?150
Some senators and witnesses raised similar concerns during the 
most recent hearings on S. 2831.151
While their concerns are understandable, they are unfounded for a 
federal shield law.  Separation of powers has made some courts 
reluctant to engage in what they perceive as a legislative function of 
defining a reporters’ shield.152  As Judge Sentelle explained, Congress 
is better positioned to resolve the “fundamental policy question 
involved in the crafting of such a privilege.”153  On the other hand, 
 145. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972) (citing Lovell v. Griffin, 303 
U.S. 444, 450, 452 (1938)). 
 146. Id. at 704. 
 147. Id. at 705. 
 148. Id. 
 149. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 438 F.3d 1141, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Sentelle, J., 
concurring). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See Hearing on H.R. 2102, supra note 15, at 91–92 (testimony of Steven Clymer, 
Professor, Cornell Law School); id. at 108–11 (statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy 
Att’y Gen., United States Department of Justice). 
 152. See supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text. 
 153. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 438 F.3d at 1156 (Sentelle, J., concurring). 
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federal courts are well positioned to apply a statutory definition of 
journalist, just as they already do in other contexts.154
Therefore, it was important for Congress to focus on what the 
person seeking coverage as a journalist was doing when he or she 
received the information being subpoenaed, and not on the medium 
of communication they used for their stories, such as blogging.  
Gregg Leslie, Legal Director for the Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press explained: 
The medium doesn’t answer the question.  It has to do more with 
the function that the person is performing . . . .  If the Bloggers’ 
involvement is to report information to the public and to gather 
information for that purpose openly then they should be treated 
like a journalist.155
To address these concerns, the House adopted a functional 
definition of journalist that included four components.  First, H.R. 
2102 focuses on whether the person seeking the privilege has 
engaged in acts of journalism:  “‘covered person’ means a person who 
regularly gathers, prepares, collects, photographs, records, writes, 
edits, reports, or publishes news or information that concerns local, 
national, or international events or other matters of public 
interest.”156  That language tracks definitions used in existing state 
shield laws such those of North Carolina157 and Oklahoma.158
Second, H.R. 2102 requires an examination of the purpose for 
gathering the information that is the subject of a subpoena.  A 
reporters’ privilege is premised upon the dissemination of 
information to the public,159 and the bill makes that requirement 
 154. For example, federal courts routinely determine whether a party qualifies for 
the media exception for payment of document fees under the Freedom of 
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II) (2000).  E.g., Long v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 450 F. Supp. 2d 42, 82–85 (D.D.C. 2006), order amended on other grounds, 457 F. 
Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 155. FixYourThinking.com, Are Bloggers Journalists?, http://jackwhispers. 
blogspot.com/2006/03/are-bloggers-journalists-courts-seem.html (Mar. 28, 2006) 
(quoting Gregg Leslie, Legal Defense Director, The Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press). 
 156. H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 4(2) (2007). 
 157. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11(a) (2007) (defining a journalist as “[a]ny 
person . . . engaged in the business of gathering, compiling, writing, editing, 
photographing, recording, or processing information for dissemination via any news 
medium,” including “print, broadcast, or other electronic means accessible to the 
general public”). 
 158. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506(A)(7) (West 1993) (defining a journalist 
as “any man or woman who is a reporter, photographer, editor, commentator, 
journalist, correspondent, announcer, or other individual regularly engaged in 
obtaining, writing, reviewing, editing, or otherwise preparing news for any 
newspaper, periodical, press association, newspaper syndicate, wire service, radio or 
television station, or other news service”) (emphasis added). 
 159. See supra notes 24–39 and accompanying text. 
  
1314 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1291 
                                                          
explicit.160  If the individual did not intend to provide that 
information to the public, then he or she would not be protected 
under the privilege.  Actual dissemination of the information is not 
required.161  This flexible approach ensures that the purpose of the 
privilege is being fulfilled.  It also is consistent with one already 
followed by federal courts.162
Third, the definition of “covered person” is limited to those 
engaging in acts of journalism for their “livelihood or for substantial 
financial gain.”163  Representatives Boucher and Pence added this 
requirement through a manager’s amendment to “narrow[] the 
definition of a ‘covered person’ to include only professional 
journalists.”164  This change ensures that casual bloggers who do not 
meet a conventional definition of a journalist—“a person whose 
occupation is journalism”165—cannot avail themselves of the shield’s 
protection.166  At the same time, it would cover freelance journalists 
who have not yet sold their story and reporters who are not in an 
employment relationship with news companies, as long as they earn 
their livelihood from their reporting. 
Fourth, several persons and entities were expressly excluded from 
the definition of “covered person”:  (1) “a foreign power or agent of a 
foreign power” as defined by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978167 (“FISA”); (2) “any organization designated . . . as a 
foreign terrorist organization” under the Immigration and 
 160. See H.R. 2102 § 4(2) (defining “covered person” for the purpose of the bill as 
“a person who regularly gathers, prepares, collects, photographs, records, writes, 
edits, reports, or publishes news or information that concerns local, national, or 
international events or other matters of public interest for dissemination to the 
public”).  
 161. This approach is necessary to allow the press to make editorial judgments on 
whether to publish information, including some information the government might 
not want to be public. Furthermore, some non-confidential information and the 
work product of journalists, including their notes and outtakes, must be protected 
even if unpublished. 
 162. See generally Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 145–46 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(holding that the author of a manuscript was not covered by a reporters’ privilege 
because the author “gathered information initially for purposes other than to 
disseminate information to the public”), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015 (1987). 
 163. H.R. 2102 § 4(2). 
 164. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-370, at 12 (2007) (additional views of Rep. Smith); see 
also 153 CONG. REC. H11, 600 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2007) (statement of Rep. Boucher) 
(pointing out that the manager’s amendment “narrows the definition of the 
individuals who may assert the privilege”). 
 165. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 762 (2d ed. 1980) (emphasis added). 
 166. See generally 153 CONG. REC. H11, 600 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2007) (statement of 
Rep. Pence) (explaining that this narrower “definition will exclude casual bloggers 
but not all bloggers”). 
 167. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)–(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
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Nationality Act;168 (3) anyone specially designated as a terrorist under 
FISA; (4) anyone specially designated as a global terrorist by the 
Treasury Department; and (5) any terrorist organization under 
FISA.169  These exceptions were added to address the concerns of the 
Director of National Intelligence that the national security exception 
“would hinder efforts to investigate and prosecute leakers of classified 
information” and could be exploited by foreign governments.170
In addition to journalists, the shield law applies to their 
communications service providers and their supervisors, employers, 
or affiliates.171  By doing so, journalists have some measure of 
protection from the problem described by Lucy Dalglish:  avoiding 
use of telephones, e-mails, notes, or conversations with their editors 
to communicate source information out of fear that they will become 
subject to being subpoenaed.172  Without that protection, journalists 
will be chilled in an entire range of communications that they 
routinely use in preparing their stories.173
B. A Qualified Privilege that Gives the Press Breathing Room 
In Branzburg, Justice Douglas advocated an absolute privilege for 
journalists to be free “from appearing or testifying before a grand 
jury, unless the reporter himself is implicated in a crime.”174  At least 
thirteen states and the District of Columbia adopted absolute 
privileges in their shield laws for confidential sources,175 five of which 
 168. 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
 169. H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 4(2) (2007). 
 170. 153 CONG. REC. H11, 589 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2007) (statement of Rep. 
Conyers). 
 171. H.R. 2102 §§ 3–4. 
 172. Dalglish Remarks, supra note 79. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 712 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see 
also supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text (summarizing Justice Douglas’s 
reasoning). 
 175. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (LexisNexis 2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 
(2003); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1995); D.C. CODE § 16-4703 (2001); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 34-46-4-2 (LexisNexis 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (West 2006); MD. 
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (LexisNexis 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902 
(2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-146 (1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (2003); N.Y. CIV. 
RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04, 
2739.12 (LexisNexis 2000); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.520 (West 2003); 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 5942 (West 2002).  The New York shield law provides a qualified 
privilege for non-confidential information or sources.  N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-
h(c). Pennsylvania requires that for at least one year radio and television stations 
maintain and keep open for inspection “an exact recording, transcription, 
kinescopic film or certified written transcript of the actual broadcast or telecast” as 
prerequisite to protection under the shield law.  42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942(b). 
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also apply to non-confidential information.176  At the federal level, the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeal has suggested the privilege may be 
absolute in some circumstances: 
 [A] journalist does in fact possess a privilege that is deeply rooted 
in the [F]irst [A]mendment.  When no countervailing 
constitutional concerns are at stake, it can be said that the privilege 
is absolute; when constitutional precepts collide, the absolute gives 
way to the qualified and a balancing process comes into play to 
determine its limits.177
However, no federal circuit, including the Third Circuit, has 
adopted an absolute reporters’ privilege in all cases.178
Earlier federal shield bills often proposed making the reporters’ 
shield absolute.  For example, a 1978 bill offered by Representative 
Philip Crane (R-Ill.) would have prohibited any federal, state, or local 
governmental authority from issuing search warrants and subpoenas 
on reporters.179  Similarly, Representative  Bill Green (R-N.Y.) 
introduced a bill in 1979 shielding journalists from disclosure of “any 
news, or sources of any news,” even to grand juries.180  The Dodd 
shield bill181 and the earlier Lugar shield bill182 included absolute 
privileges for the disclosure of journalists’ confidential sources and 
information.  All proved unworkable. 
The reason is evident.  There was a developing consensus that the 
reporters’ privilege must yield to other competing concerns in 
certain circumstances.  Professor Geoffrey Stone argued for an 
absolute privilege, but acknowledged some cases when it should not 
apply.183  A qualified privilege can strike the right balance.  The press 
can have breathing room under a federal shield, subject to some 
narrow exceptions. 
H.R. 2102 provides for a qualified privilege “that prevents a 
reporter’s source material from being revealed except under narrow 
circumstances.”184  Thus, it does not, as Professor Clymer contends, 
 176. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070; MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902; NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-
146; NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275; OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520. 
 177. United States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 356 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
1113 (1981). 
 178. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 179. Id. 
 180. A Short History, supra note 136, at 9. 
 181. Free Speech Protection Act of 2005, S. 369, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 182. Free Flow of Information Act of 2005, S. 340, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 183. See Reporters’ Shield Legislation:  Issues and Implications, Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Hearing, Issues and 
Implications] (testimony of Geoffrey R. Stone, Professor, University of Chicago Law 
School). 
 184. H.R. REP. NO. 110-370, at 3 (2007). 
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ensure that reporters can provide “absolute, unqualified assurances 
of confidentiality” to their sources.185
Section two of the bill sets the basic parameters for the privilege, 
which generally follow Justice Stewart’s balancing test:186
In any matter arising under Federal law, a Federal entity may not 
compel a covered person to provide testimony or produce any 
document related to information obtained or created by such 
covered person as part of engaging in journalism, unless a court 
determines by a preponderance of the evidence, after providing 
such notice and an opportunity to be heard to such covered 
person— 
that the party seeking to compel production of such testimony or 
document has exhausted all reasonable alternative sources (other 
than the covered person) of the testimony or document; 
that . . . the testimony or document sought is critical [to the matter 
in which it is sought] . . . ; 
in the case that the testimony or document sought could reveal the 
identity of a source of information or include any information that 
could reasonably be expected to lead to the discovery of the 
identity of such a source, that— 
disclosure of the identity of such a source is necessary [or essential] 
to prevent, or to identify any perpetrator of, an act of terrorism . . .; 
(B) . . . to prevent imminent death or significant bodily harm . . . ; 
. . . to identify a person who has disclosed . . . a trade secret, . . . ; 
individually identifiable health information, . . . ; or nonpublic 
personal information . . . ; or 
(D) . . . [to identify in a criminal investigation or prosecution the 
source of an unauthorized leak that] has caused or will cause 
significant and articulable harm to the national security; and 
(4) that the public interest in compelling disclosure of the 
information or document involved outweighs the public interest in 
gathering or disseminating news or information.187
The balancing test merely requires that “law enforcement . . . 
pursue other sources of information before being able to turn to 
journalists for their notes.” 188
During the floor vote, the House added one additional factor to be 
included in the balancing test:  “a court may consider the extent of 
 185. Clymer Remarks, supra note 110. 
 186. See supra notes 64–67 and accompanying text. 
 187. H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2007). 
 188. H.R. REP. NO. 110-370, at 8. 
  
1318 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1291 
                                                          
any harm to national security.”189  The purpose of this amendment 
was to allow “the judge to consider this factor in any case, not just a 
criminal case.  It allows a judge to consider any leak that harms 
national security, not just a leak in violation of the laws on classified 
information.”190
The bill also includes certain limitations on the content of 
information that can be obtained from journalists.  The content of 
any testimony or document that is compelled shall: 
 [N]ot be overbroad, unreasonable, or oppressive and, as 
appropriate, be limited to the purpose of verifying published 
information or describing any surrounding circumstances relevant 
to the accuracy of such published information; and 
be narrowly tailored in subject matter and period of time covered 
so as to avoid compelling production of peripheral, nonessential, 
or speculative information.191
At the same time, the shield does not apply to journalists who are 
eyewitnesses to or participants in criminal or tortious conduct, except 
where the alleged conduct “is the act of transmitting or 
communicating the information, record, document, or item sought 
for disclosure.”192  In this manner, “[t]he bill . . . strikes a balance with 
respect to promoting the free dissemination of information and 
ensuring effective law enforcement and the fair administration of 
justice.”193
IV. A BALANCED SHIELD LAW THAT ADEQUATELY ADDRESSES 
LEGITIMATE CONCERNS 
Professors Clymer and Eliason ably presented many of the 
arguments against a federal shield law in an incisive manner that 
often was as entertaining as it was informative.  As current and former 
prosecutors, each provided a thorough summation of some of the 
issues that Congress has wrestled with since Branzburg was decided.  
Their respective contributions to the debate over a federal shield law, 
both in the halls of Congress and in the lecture hall at the 
Washington College of Law, are invaluable.  The experiences of such 
public servants are essential to ensuring that any federal shield law 
that is enacted adequately reflects all competing concerns. 
 189. H.R. 2102 § 2(b). 
 190. 153 CONG. REC. H11, 601 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2007) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 191. H.R. 2102 § 2(c). 
 192. H.R. 2102 § 2(e). 
 193. H.R. REP. NO. 110-370, at 3. 
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Nevertheless, as is often the case in federal legislation, reasonable 
minds can differ on how those concerns should be resolved.  In some 
instances, there simply is a divergence of opinion about the empirical 
evidence needed to justify the shield law.  In others, their criticism 
already has been adequately addressed by the shield bill that passed 
the House.  However, the crux of the opposition to Professors Clymer 
and Eliason, and indeed the Bush Administration, lies in a 
fundamental variance in the role that they believe the courts should 
play in keeping federal prosecutors in check.  It is that last point that 
cuts most against their argument, as many conservatives—including a 
number of former federal prosecutors—have acknowledged. 
There are several criticisms of a federal shield law offered by 
Professor Clymer and Professor Eliason.  First, they maintain that 
there is no evidence that, without a shield, confidential sources will 
dry up and chill the free flow of information to the public.194  Second, 
Professor Clymer contends that a shield actually impedes the 
purposes of the First Amendment by denying the public information 
that it wants to know.195  Third, Professor Eliason insists that even 
without a shield law, other alternatives can work just as effectively to 
get information from confidential sources.196  Fourth, both argue that 
a privilege is special treatment that places reporters above the law 
and promises more than it can deliver.197  Fifth, they reason that a 
shield will effectively immunize those who illegally leak information 
to the press.198  Sixth, both claim that a journalist’s shield is very costly 
and will lead to unjust civil and criminal results.199  This Part will 
explain why their concerns either are unfounded or are outweighed 
by the important public interests advanced by H.R. 2102. 
A. Unregulated Federal Subpoenas Have a Chilling Effect 
According to both Professors Clymer and Eliason, one of the 
leading reasons not to adopt a shield law is that it is unnecessary.  
Their argument comes in two parts.  First, Professor Eliason asserts 
that there is no evidence of a dramatic increase in federal subpoenas 
being issued without a shield law.200  His conclusion is certainly 
 194. See infra Part IV.A. 
 195. See infra Part IV.B. 
 196. See infra Part IV.C. 
 197. See infra Part IV.D. 
 198. See infra Part IV.E. 
 199. See infra Part IV.F. 
 200. Professor Randall Eliason, Remarks at the American University Law Review 
Symposium:  Left Out in the Cold?  The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the 
Press in Post-9/11 America (Sept. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Eliason Remarks], video 
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/symposia.cfm#. 
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plausible, if we only consider the number of subpoenas reported by 
the attorney general in the past few years.  During hearings on H.R. 
2102, a Justice Department representative testified that subpoenas 
had been sought in only nineteen cases since 1991, including just 
four since 2001.201
However, that statistic does not tell the complete story.  The 
number of journalists subpoenaed is far greater than the number of 
cases in which the department has sought them.  In 2001, the 
Department of Justice “disclosed that it had issued 88 subpoenas 
involving news reporters in the previous decade.”202 Seventeen of 
those “sought information about confidential sources, while others 
sought notes and other unpublished materials or testimony to verify 
what reporters had published or broadcast.”203  According to another 
news account, echoed by the Reporters Committee,204 “[m]ore than 
40 reporters have been questioned in recent years by federal 
prosecutors about their sources, notes and reports in civil and 
criminal cases.”205
Further, the Department’s statistics for subpoenas directed at 
reporters do not include those sought by special prosecutors, which 
comprise a large number of recent cases in which subpoenas have 
been issued.206  Regardless of the actual number of subpoenas, and 
irrespective of whether that number means that “journalists are 
drowning in a sea of subpoenas,”207 the results are still evident. 
Lucy Dalglish reported that in the first few years she was with the 
Reporters Committee, it “had only one major showdown in the 
federal courts, and that was involving a Houston freelancer by the 
name of Vanessa Leggett.”208  In contrast, today Ms. Dalglish says the 
Reporters Committee is “working on subpoenas all the time.”209  The 
Reporters Committee’s experience is corroborated by the apparent 
lack of subpoenas issued between 1976 and 2000 to compel 
 201. Hearing on H.R. 2102, supra note 15, at 18 (testimony of Rachel Brand, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Policy, United States Department of Justice). 
 202. Adam Liptak, Leaks and the Courts:  There’s Law, But Little Order, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 5, 2003, at WK3. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Dalglish Remarks, supra note 79. 
 205. Editorial, Protecting Sources:  Preserving the Free Flow of Information, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 21, 2007, reprinted in 153 CONG. REC. H11, 595 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2007). 
 206. Dalglish Remarks, supra note 79. 
 207. REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, AGENTS OF DISCOVERY:  A 
REPORT ON THE INCIDENCE OF SUBPOENAS SERVED ON THE NEWS MEDIA IN 1997 1 (1999). 
 208. Dalglish Remarks, supra note 79. 
 209. Id. 
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journalists to reveal their sources:  only two, both of which were 
quashed.210
Second, Professor Clymer takes issue with the notion that there is a 
chilling effect.  He contends that “there is no evidence that the 
absence of [a journalist’s] privilege, which has been the law for 
years . . . prevents sources from coming forward.”211  According to that 
argument, echoed by Representative Lamar Smith of Texas during 
the House floor debate, “for 200 years in this Nation, the press, in 
fact, has flourished.  Information has flowed freely.  And that is why I 
believe this bill is simply a solution in search of a real problem.”212
When Representative Pence spoke at the Symposium, he described 
an oft-cited example of a source who would have been chilled without 
judicial protection:  “Deep Throat.”213  He asserted, “[n]ot long ago, 
[a] reporters’ assurance of confidentiality was unquestionable.  That 
assurance led to sources . . . like [in] Watergate, where 
government . . . misdeeds were brought to light . . . .  However, the 
press cannot, this day, make the same assurance of confidentiality to 
sources.”214  Professor Clymer took strong exception to Representative 
Pence’s argument, contending that he was “flat out wrong” about the 
law being different during Watergate.215  The facts do not support 
Professor Clymer’s conclusion.  When Bob Woodward and Carl 
Bernstein were subpoenaed to identify their source in 1973, the court 
quashed the subpoenas.  The court reasoned that it “cannot blind 
itself to the possible ‘chilling effect’ the enforcement of these broad 
subpoenas would have on the flow of information to the press, and so 
to the public.”216
Whether there is a chilling effect on speech in the absence of a 
journalist’s privilege is an open question, if it is only the numbers that 
matter.  Lucy Dalglish is correct that “it’s very difficult to prove 
anything about the need.”217  How do you prove the negative—
namely, that without a shield law, fewer confidential sources are 
 210. Hearing on H.R. 2102, supra note 15, at 32 (testimony of Lee Levine, Partner, 
Levine, Sullivan, Koch & Schulz). 
 211. Clymer Remarks, supra note 110. 
 212. 153 CONG. REC. H11, 590 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2007) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 213. Congressman Mike Pence, Remarks at the American University Law Review 
Symposium:  Left Out in the Cold? The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the 
Press in Post-9/11 America (Sept. 20, 2007), video available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/symposia.cfm#. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Clymer Remarks, supra note 110. 
 216. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1397 (D.D.C. 1973). 
 217. Dalglish Remarks, supra note 79. 
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coming forward?  You can try to measure it, but empirically it is 
virtually an impossible task, as the Court explained in Branzburg: 
The available data indicate that some newsmen rely a great deal on 
confidential sources and that some informants are particularly 
sensitive to the threat of exposure and may be silenced if it is held 
by this Court that, ordinarily, newsmen must testify pursuant to 
subpoenas, but the evidence fails to demonstrate that there would 
be a significant constriction of the flow of news to the public if this 
Court reaffirms the prior common-law and constitutional rule 
regarding the testimonial obligations of newsmen.  Estimates of the 
inhibiting effect of such subpoenas on the willingness of 
informants to make disclosures to newsmen are widely divergent 
and to a great extent speculative.  It would be difficult to canvass 
the views of the informants themselves; surveys of reporters on this 
topic are chiefly opinions of predicted informant behavior and 
must be viewed in the light of the professional self-interest of the 
interviewees.218
That has not stopped researchers from trying to prove the chilling 
effect.  Professor Vince Blasi’s 1971 study is perhaps the best known 
one.219  Among the 975 reporters interviewed, slightly more than half 
said that they relied on confidential sources for at least ten percent of 
their stories.220  Among those using confidential sources, eight 
percent reported with some certainty that their ability to report had 
been adversely affected by the threat of a subpoena.221  Professor Blasi 
acknowledged the methodological problems he faced in trying to 
resolve the question of a chilling effect.222
A separate study conducted by John Osborn in 1985 did little to 
clarify the issue.223  According to that study, 31.25% of responding 
reporters relied on confidential sources in their news stories.224  
Slightly less than twenty percent of respondents reported that their 
stories were hurt by the possibility of having to identify their 
confidential sources.225  Yet, nearly all reported that they were 
 218. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693–94 (1972) (footnotes omitted). 
 219. See generally Vince Blasi, The Newsman’s Privilege:  An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. 
L. REV. 229 (1971).  Professor Blasi’s study was cited by the Supreme Court in 
Branzburg,  408 U.S. at 694 n.33. 
 220. Blasi, supra note 219, at 247. 
 221. Id. at 270. 
 222. Id. at 235–39. 
 223. See generally John E. Osborn, The Reporter’s Confidentiality Privilege:  Updating the 
Empirical Evidence After a Decade of Subpoenas, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57 (1985). 
 224. Id. at 73. 
 225. Id. at 74–75. 
  
2008] ENACTING A REASONABLE FEDERAL SHIELD LAW 1323 
                                                          
“threatened by the potential diminution of the present limited and 
uncertain protection” in the absence of a shield law.226
The utility of both studies is lessened because the research is 
somewhat stale.  That conclusion is especially true if, in fact, there has 
been an upsurge in the number of subpoenas issued in recent years.  
It therefore is welcome news that a professor at the University of 
Arizona is updating the Blasi and Osborn studies with more 
contemporary data.227  Nevertheless, assuming that study faces the 
same obstacles as the earlier ones, not to mention the likelihood that 
some detractors will take exception to it regardless of the results, 
where does that leave us? 
Well, for one thing, we have several examples of the chilling effect.  
Many reporters have described cases in which the threat of disclosure 
shut down their confidential sources.  As columnist William Safire 
testified, “[b]elieve me, when a journalist is threatened with jail or, 
indeed, is jailed for refusing to blow the whistle on a whistleblower or 
to betray a trusting source, he or she feels a coercive chill.”228
Lucy Dalglish also points out that it is increasingly common for 
federal judges to impose heavy fines—hundreds or even thousands of 
dollars a day—on journalists in contempt, and sometimes even 
prohibit their employers from paying it.229  Unless a journalist is 
independently wealthy, and few are, lengthy jail sentences and hefty 
fines certainly can discourage reporters from printing stories derived 
from confidential sources likely to be sought by prosecutors or civil 
litigants.  Lee Levine testified during the House hearing on  
H.R. 2102 about one such case: 
 [T]he Cleveland Plain Dealer . . . decided that it was obliged to 
withhold from publication two investigative reports because they 
were predicated on documents provided by confidential sources. 
Doug Clifton, the newspaper’s editor, explained that the public 
would have been well-served to know about these stories, but that 
publishing them would “almost certainly lead to a leak investigation 
and the ultimate choice:  talk or go to jail.  Because talking isn’t an 
option and jail is too high a price to pay, these two stories will go 
untold for now.”230
 226. Id. at 77. 
 227. Dalglish Remarks, supra note 79. 
 228. Hearing on H.R. 2102, supra note 15, at 29 (testimony of William Safire, 
Chairman, The Dana Foundation). 
 229. Dalglish Remarks, supra note 79. 
 230. Hearing on H.R. 2102, supra note 15, at 33 (testimony of Lee Levine, Partner, 
Levine, Sullivan, Koch & Schulz). 
  
1324 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:1291 
                                                          
Representative John Yarmuth, a former journalist,231 also described 
the impact of not being able to assure anonymity to a source: 
At my newspaper in Louisville, we were able to open doors for the 
community on several occasions due to confidential accounts of 
protected sources which would have otherwise remained closed to 
us forever. . . .  [W]e saw what happens when we fail to protect a 
source’s identity.  There, Jeffrey Wigand, the famous tobacco 
whistle-blower, was victimized by threats and intimidation, 
ultimately losing his job, his family and his home.  He is considered 
a hero today, but for many the lesson from that episode was, if you 
have incriminating information that will benefit the American 
public, just keep it to yourself.232
But it is not just reporters and Democrats who feel that way.  Many 
conservative Republicans, including minority whip Roy Blunt233 and 
Representative Pence,234 the latter a former journalist, have reached 
the same conclusion. 
In the end, it is unnecessary to resolve the question of whether the 
lack of a shield law causes a chilling effect.  Instead, as the Court 
acknowledged in Branzburg, that is a policy decision left to the 
legislative branch:  Congress is free “to determine whether a statutory 
newsman’s privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion 
standards and rules as narrow or broad as . . . necessary.”235  Having 
decided that a journalist’s privilege is necessary, by a vote of 398 to 
21, undoubtedly federal courts uninterested in legislating from the 
bench will not disturb that judgment. 
B. A Shield Law Will Facilitate, Not Inhibit, the Free Flow of Information 
Professor Clymer next makes what can be characterized as one of 
the more unusual arguments against a shield law.  He maintains that 
a shield law undermines the free flow of information because it “will 
deny . . . the public, very important information [it] ought to have 
about the way the government operates and other newsworthy 
stories.”236  How does he reach that conclusion? 
He begins by citing several high profile cases, including the leak of 
Valerie Plame’s identity, the BALCO grand jury leak, and the leak of 
information that Wen Ho Lee and Steven Hatfill were suspects in 
 231. Congressman John Yarmuth:  John’s Biography, http://yarmuth.house.gov/ 
?sectionid=28&sectiontree=6,28&itemid=8 (last visited Apr. 12, 2008). 
 232. 153 CONG. REC. H11, 592 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2007) (statement of Rep. 
Yarmuth). 
 233. Id. at 591 (statement of Rep. Blunt). 
 234. Id. at 591–92 (statement of Rep. Pence). 
 235. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972). 
 236. Clymer Remarks, supra note 110. 
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criminal investigations.237  In each of these cases, either the 
government or the civil litigant subpoenaed journalists who reported 
information obtained from a leak given an assurance of anonymity.238  
Professor Clymer chides the journalists for resisting the subpoenas, 
supported by a “well financed entity [that] has fought tooth and nail 
to keep information about those leaks from the public,”239 including  
“the identity and the circumstances of the leaks.”240
This clever bit of rhetoric does not comport with reality in several 
important respects.  As an initial matter, opponents of a shield law do 
not want to know the identity of leakers because of an altruistic desire 
to inform the public about them.  Prosecutors like Professor Clymer 
subpoena journalists to learn the identity of sources so they can 
prosecute them.  Civil litigants, such as Lee and Hatfill, are seeking 
the identity in an attempt to win a civil judgment that benefits 
themselves, not the public at large.  To the extent that information 
about the identity of leaks might be published when those cases are 
tried, any benefit to the public is purely secondary to the primary self-
interests that prosecutors and litigants are pursuing. 
In addition, Professor Clymer’s assertion assumes that confidential 
sources will still come forward if they know that a journalist’s 
assurance of anonymity will never be honored.  Common sense, as 
well as the experience of journalists,241 tells us otherwise.  A source 
would have to be dumb enough or reckless enough to talk to a 
reporter without regard for his or her safety or well-being.  What is far 
more likely to happen is the alternative suggested by Professor 
Eliason in his House testimony:  if confidential sources still come 
forward, they will not reveal their identity to journalists, choosing 
instead to drop anonymous notes or place untraceable calls.242  In the 
process, many important stories will be killed because editors have no 
way to corroborate the underlying details.243  After all, professional 
journalists cannot take shortcuts in reporting the news. 
In a similar vein, the argument presupposes that the leak itself is 
news that will be reported.  But if the source of the leak has nowhere 
to go without revealing himself or herself, many leaks simply will not 
happen in the first place.  In that way, Professor Clymer is not just 
putting the cart before the horse; there is no cart and no horse.  It 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. See supra notes 228–232 and accompanying text. 
 242. See infra notes 253–257 and accompanying text. 
 243. See infra notes 261–264 and accompanying text. 
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appears that is precisely the result that many government officials 
would prefer. 
Concomitantly, Professor Clymer acknowledges the importance of 
leaks in ensuring a well-informed public.  He concedes “that 
confidential sources are essential in a free country,” without which 
“reporters are reduced to simply regurgitating official versions of 
news events, versions that may be incomplete or inadequate.”244  He 
further admits that “we have seen some of the most important leaks 
in decades come very recently; leaks about secret CIA presence in 
Europe, leaks about warrantless wiretapping, leaks about abuses at 
Abu Ghraib prison.”245  That leads him to conclude that the lack of a 
federal shield law has not stopped the presses. 
That may be true.  But at the same time, the fact that journalists 
were prepared to go to jail and face substantial fines to protect their 
sources made those leaks possible.  Given the recent trends we have 
seen in terms of the increasingly aggressive stance of the courts, 
federal government, and civil litigants in pursuing source identity 
from reporters, the continued absence of a federal shield law does 
not bode well for the prospect that those leaks will be forthcoming in 
the future.  That is precisely why most commentators and members of 
Congress have concluded that in the debate over H.R. 2102, a shield 
law lives up to its name:  preserving, not impeding, the free flow of 
information to the public. 
C. Alternatives to a Shield Law are Less Effective 
Professor Eliason maintains that a journalist’s privilege is not 
needed because of the limits of confidentiality and “the availability of 
anonymous tips.”246  Curiously, in both instances, Professor Clymer 
and Professor Eliason make several concessions that directly 
undermine that argument.  Instead of disproving the need for a 
shield law, their contentions reinforce the policy and practical 
concerns that led to the enactment of H.R. 2102. 
Preliminarily, the alternative protection proposed by Professor 
Eliason rings hollow.  He asserts that “[b]y simply promising never 
voluntarily to reveal a source’s name . . . a reporter can assure a high 
degree of confidentiality.”247  He says that a reporter may simply tell a 
source: 
 244. Clymer Remarks, supra note 110. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Hearing on H.R. 2102, supra note 15, at 57 (testimony of Randall Eliason, 
Professor, George Washington University Law School). 
 247. Id. at 55. 
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I will do all I can to protect your identity.  I will not publish it, will 
not reveal it to anyone else voluntarily, and if I am ever 
subpoenaed I will fight as far and as hard as I can to avoid having to 
divulge it.  Only if I’m compelled to do so by a valid court order 
after exhausting all of my appeals would I reveal your name.248
Professor Clymer made a similar argument at the Symposium.249
Let’s test their argument.  Place yourself in the shoes of a 
government employee who has learned about the Bush 
Administration’s illegal warrantless wiretapping program.250  In 2005, 
you call two New York Times reporters with the intention to reveal that 
following 9/11, “President Bush secretly authorized the National 
Security Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the 
United States to search for evidence of terrorist activity without the 
court-approved warrants ordinarily required for domestic spying.”251  
You are well aware that President Bush stated in 2003, “if there is a 
leak out of my administration, I want to know who it is.  And if the 
person has violated law, the person will be taken care of.”252
In response, the reporters you call, Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, 
recite Professor Eliason’s script for assuring you an empty promise of 
confidentiality.  What do you do?  Common sense and Professor 
Clymer provide the answer:  “Now, if that happens and the source 
says to the reporter, ‘Without that guarantee [of confidentiality], I’m 
not talking to you’ and hangs up,” there has been a chilling effect.253  
Experience tells us that the government does not lose in federal court 
when it subpoenas a journalist in a criminal investigation before a 
grand jury to identify a source, regardless of how many appeals are 
taken.254  Armed with that knowledge, you are not going to reveal the 
illegal program unless you want to be charged with treason and face, 
at a minimum, a lengthy prison sentence.  In the process, the illegal 
government program continues, free of public scrutiny or 
 248. Id. 
 249. Clymer Remarks, supra note 110. 
 250. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Security Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 
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congressional oversight.  What Professor Clymer describes as an 
“extremely important leak” never occurs.255
Professor Eliason’s alternative suggestion that sources simply can 
provide their information anonymously to reporters is equally empty.  
He argues that “a source who wants to leak information to a reporter 
but is worried about being identified always has the option of making 
an anonymous phone call.”256  But even Professor Eliason does not 
seem convinced, acknowledging that it is “probably true” that “an 
anonymous tip is not as useful or reliable as a known source.”257
That is unsurprising.  Certainly, Professor Eliason’s own experience 
as a federal prosecutor should tell him that a confidential source that 
remains anonymous even to law enforcement is worth very little.  It is 
well established that “[w]hen confronted with hearsay information 
from a confidential informant, ‘a court must consider the veracity, 
reliability, and the basis of knowledge for that information as part of 
the totality of the circumstances for evaluating the impact of that 
information.’”258  If an affidavit attesting to the veracity of a 
confidential source is not provided—and it cannot be if investigators 
do not know the identity of the source—there must be “substantial 
independent police corroboration.”259  If corroborating evidence is 
unavailable, the information obtained from the anonymous source is 
worthless and will not support issuing a warrant.260
The same holds true for anonymous tips to journalists.  As William 
Safire testified: 
The idea that it is easy for a source to simply send in [an] 
anonymous document and expect any results from it is unrealistic.  
No good reporter will take a tip or a document from an 
anonymous source that he can’t get back to and ask questions of 
and check out.  That is the whole idea of reporting, is [sic] to see if 
you can trust our source.261
Mr. Safire provided a compelling example to support his 
conclusion.  For years, he relied upon confidential tips provided by 
William Casey, who later became the director of the CIA.262  At one 
point during their relationship, Safire said that Casey “lied in his 
 255. Clymer Remarks, supra note 110. 
 256. Hearing on H.R. 2102, supra note 15, at 57 (testimony of Randall Eliason, 
Professor, George Washington University Law School). 
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 258. United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526, 532 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
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Chairman, The Dana Foundation). 
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teeth” by telling him that he had not talked to reporter Bob 
Woodward.263  The only way he was able to determine that was by 
knowing the identity of his source and getting a tip from another 
known source to tell him the information Casey provided to him was 
false.264  Journalists cannot rely upon anonymous sources and false 
assurances of confidentiality any more than federal prosecutors can. 
D. H.R. 2102 Provides Necessary, but Qualified, “Special Protection” 
Professor Clymer takes issue with a federal shield law because 
underlying the privilege is a desire “to treat reporters differently.”265  
He explains, “[w]hat we are talking about is whether we should carve 
out a special legal rule that applies to reporters, when it doesn’t apply 
to most other witnesses.”266  He is absolutely correct.  As Lucy Dalglish 
explained, “it is in our interest to . . . show a little humility when 
we’re asking for that particular privilege because it is something 
special that nobody else gets other than a select few folks.”267
There are strong policy reasons behind this special protection.  As 
the House Judiciary Committee observed, “[p]rivileges are created to 
promote sharing information without the fear that either party will be 
forced to disclose to a third party.”268  The Committee noted that 
there are “typically two bases in the First Amendment” that support 
the privilege:  “(1) the need to protect the free flow of information 
and ideas, and (2) the need to keep the government from interfering 
with the press or using it as an investigative arm.”269  Professor Clymer 
apparently recognizes the value of both reasons.270
Professor Eliason, on the other hand, questions them.  He cites the 
BALCO case as an example for why the public policy is disserved by a 
shield law: 
Working with [defense attorney Troy] Ellerman [in publishing 
information obtained from grand jury testimony about the federal 
steroid investigation] and concealing his criminal scheme was not 
essential to the public’s ultimate right to know.  It did, however, 
allow the Chronicle reporters to get the “scoop” by reporting certain 
information first, and to obtain exclusive material and greater 
publicity for their book.  All of this advanced their careers 
 263. Id. at 76. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Clymer Remarks, supra note 110. 
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considerably.  It appears that the reporters’ desire to be out front 
on this story and their zeal to protect their source at any cost led 
them to close their eyes to Ellerman’s crimes and to the significant 
harm caused by their own actions.271
The evidence suggests the contrary.  The reporting of Mark 
Fainaru-Wada and Lance Williams, including the source information 
from Ellerman, provided an important public service.  Their link 
between professional athletes and growing steroid use in the public 
schools proved critical to raising the public’s consciousness of the 
growing epidemic.272  Representatives John Conyers (D-Mich.) and 
Tom Davis (R-Va.) lauded their work by observing, “[s]ome of the 
most moving testimony before Congress was from parents of teenage 
athletes who had taken their own lives as a result of steroid abuse, 
demonstrating the public health crisis exposed by the two San 
Francisco Chronicle reporters.”273  They “put a face” on the issue of 
steroids and children.274  For their reporting, they received accolades 
from the press,275 Republican and Democratic members of 
Congress,276 the California attorney general,277 and even President 
Bush.278  The two reporters did not cause any harm because the 
subpoenas directed at them proved wholly unnecessary when 
Ellerman, their source, came forward voluntarily.279
Professor Eliason’s implication that a privilege is improper because 
journalists may be motivated by self-serving reasons that deny the 
public valuable information is without merit.  H.R. 2102 does not 
apply the shield to any journalist who obtains information from a 
 271. Hearing on H.R. 2102, supra note 15, at 63 (testimony of Randall Eliason, 
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confidential source for purposes other than disseminating it to the 
public.280  Additionally, even when public dissemination is intended, 
the shield still can be pierced if the source’s identity is essential and is 
unavailable from other sources.281
Moreover, merely because journalists win accolades and advance 
their careers for reporting their stories to the public does not mean 
that their self-interests have trumped the very real service they are 
performing, any more than would Justice Department merit 
recognition of the successes of a career prosecutor.  The fact that 
Woodward and Bernstein profited in their reporting of Deep 
Throat’s leaks does not repudiate the importance of the free flow of 
information about Watergate to the public.  The greater harm would 
have occurred if they either did not report the scandal or they shut 
off all of their future confidential sources by revealing Felt’s 
identity.282
Furthermore, the media’s special status under a shield law is not so 
different than the special role the press plays as the eyes and ears of 
the public.  The press is allowed space in courtrooms and committee 
rooms, at White House events, on Air Force One, at Guantanamo 
hearings, when other members of the public are not admitted.  These 
are all ways in which the media is afforded special treatment, not for 
its own benefit but for the benefit of public information. 
Professor Eliason also maintains that a shield law promises more 
than it can deliver because it will not keep reporters out of jail.283  He 
reasons, “[e]ven where there is a privilege . . . , if a court rules it does 
not apply . . . the reporter will often refuse to obey the court’s 
order. . . .  [T]herefore, journalists are asking Congress for a new 
legal protection, while . . . preparing to defy that law . . . when they 
don’t agree with a judge’s decision.”284
There is some truth in his argument.  H.R. 2102 provides for a 
qualified and not an absolute privilege.285  That means that sometimes 
a court will find that a journalist must comply with a subpoena 
because of an applicable exception.  A qualified privilege is necessary 
to address many legitimate concerns raised by Professor Clymer, 
 280. See supra notes 160–162 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 184–190 and accompanying text. 
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Professor Eliason, and others.286  But compromising to protect 
competing interests bolsters, not invalidates, the legitimacy of the 
federal shield.  Indeed, if the privilege were absolute, presumably 
both Professor Clymer and Professor Eliason would be among the 
first to point out that it could deny a criminal defendant exculpatory 
evidence in violation of the Sixth Amendment,287 as well as other key 
information available under the bill.288
Reporters recognize that a qualified privilege will not always 
protect them from revealing their sources.  As Lucy Dalglish 
observed, media organizations and newsrooms already have 
responded by “coming up with guidelines on . . . when [reporters 
are] allowed to use confidential sources and when they are not.”289  
Those actions reflect the reality that journalists cannot promise 
anonymity in all cases, with or without a shield law. 
News organizations also need to be given more credit for their 
willingness to comply with lawful court orders after they have 
exhausted all appeals.  That is precisely what happened when 
Matthew Cooper, a reporter for Time magazine, was subpoenaed to 
identify the source of the Valerie Plame leak.  In a statement to its 
readers, Time’s editors explained that they did so because “[t]he same 
Constitution that protects the freedom of the press requires 
obedience to final decisions of the courts and respect for their 
rulings and judgments.”290  If individual reporters or news 
organizations choose a different path than Time by violating a lawful 
order, they will of course have to face the consequences.  
E. H.R. 2102 Does Not Immunize Anyone from Prosecution 
Professor Clymer further asserts that a federal shield law would 
immunize those who unlawfully leak information to journalists.  He 
reasons: 
If a Congressman . . . wants to leak classified information . . . he can 
now have one of those off-the-record conversations . . . with the 
reporter, [and] if there is a reporter privilege he can sleep soundly 
at night knowing that he is immune from prosecution.  Why does it 
immunize a leaker from prosecution?  Well, if the investigators go 
to the leaker, the leaker can assert his Fifth Amendment privilege 
 286. Id. 
 287. Eliason Remarks, supra note 200. 
 288. See supra Part III.B. 
 289. Dalglish Remarks, supra note 79. 
 290. Press Release, Time Inc., Statement of Time Inc. on the Matthew Cooper 
Case (June 30, 2005), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1078 
444,00.html. 
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and not have to give any information.  And the reporter . . . can 
assert the reporter’s privilege and not have to give any information.  
And if it’s a two-party conversation where this leak occurs there is 
no other source[] of information to solve this crime.291
Professor Eliason provided similar testimony before the House, 
arguing that a shield bill “would effectively grant immunity from 
prosecution to many who leak classified information,” possibly 
resulting in an increase in “illegal leaks of classified information or 
other illegal communications with reporters.”292
Both Professor Clymer and Professor Eliason are far off the mark.  
As an initial matter, they should be more precise in their use of 
terms.  “Immunity” refers to a situation in which a witness is given a 
binding promise that he or she cannot be prosecuted for a crime or 
tort.293  Nothing in the shield law meets that definition.  No one, 
regardless of whether he or she is a source of illegal information or a 
reporter engaging in unlawful conduct, is immunized by a shield law. 
Their argument also presupposes that the shield law provides an 
absolute privilege, which does not comport with the reality of H.R. 
2102.  The bill contains a qualified privilege with a number of 
exceptions that avoid the catastrophic results predicted by both 
professors.294  The best way to illustrate this is by using Professor 
Clymer’s own example. 
Let’s assume the government wants to learn the identity of the 
congressman who leaked the classified information.  Despite 
following every “reasonable alternative source[] (other than the 
covered person),”295 investigators have come up empty.  The 
government then proceeds to federal court to request a subpoena to 
compel the reporter to reveal the name of the congressman.  
Accompanying its request, the government provides an affidavit in 
which it states:  the information reported in the newspaper was 
properly classified; its disclosure provides reasonable grounds to 
believe a crime has occurred; its disclosure is likely to harm national 
security; the government has exhausted efforts to obtain the leak’s 
identity from other sources; and the identity is critical to prosecuting 
the crime.  Under H.R. 2102, the government would be able to meet 
 291. Clymer Remarks, supra note 110. 
 292. Hearing on H.R. 2102, supra note 15, at 59 (testimony of Randall Eliason, 
Professor, George Washington University Law School). 
 293. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 751 (6th ed. 1990). 
 294. See supra Part III.B. 
 295. H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2007). 
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its showing under a preponderance of the evidence and the 
subpoena would be issued.296
The House Judiciary Committee and managers of H.R. 2102 went 
to great pains to address the Justice Department’s concerns that a 
journalist’s shield would impede federal investigations.  
Representative Boucher described some of the changes incorporated 
into the manager’s amendment: 
First, [it] expands the instances in which source disclosure can be 
compelled to include a leak . . . of properly classified 
information . . . . 
Secondly, source disclosure could be compelled when the reporter 
personally witnesses criminal conduct or when the reporter is 
himself involved in criminal conduct. 
Third, source disclosure could occur when necessary to identify any 
perpetrator of an act of terrorism . . . or other . . . harm to national 
security.297
A motion to recommit offered by Representative Smith was 
adopted providing that a “judge may consider the extent of any harm 
to national security” regardless of whether the information is 
classified and protect “national security against harmful leaks in all 
cases, not just criminal cases.”298
These amendments, along with the preponderance of the evidence 
standard, dramatically expanded the exceptions to allow the 
government to pierce the shield in any case involving properly 
classified information unobtainable from other sources.  As House 
Judiciary Committee chairman John Conyers pointed out, “If the 
exceptions were any broader, it would swallow up the rule itself. . . .  I 
have no doubt that if . . . disclosure of the source is necessary to 
prevent . . . harm to national security” a court will compel 
disclosure.299
Even Representative Lamar Smith, one of the staunchest 
opponents of a shield law, was exasperated by the position of the 
government and federal prosecutors such as Professor Clymer and 
Professor Eliason.  He observed, “despite efforts to accommodate 
their concerns, the Justice Department still opposes the bill. . . .  But 
DOJ should do more than complain; they should negotiate in good 
 296. Id. § 2. 
 297. 153 CONG. REC. H11, 600 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2007) (statement of Rep. 
Boucher). 
 298. Id. at 601 (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 299. Id. at 589 (statement of Rep. Conyers). 
  
2008] ENACTING A REASONABLE FEDERAL SHIELD LAW 1335 
                                                          
faith and provide the Committee with language that addresses their 
concerns.”300
In the end, opponents of the shield bill need to be straight about 
what it does and does not do.  By its unambiguous terms, H.R. 2102 
does not immunize anyone or any conduct from prosecution.  It has 
very broad exceptions that will ensure that identity information will 
be made available to prosecutors where no other source is available, 
especially in cases involving leaks of classified information or other 
disclosures harmful to national security.  The contrary assertions by 
Professor Clymer and Professor Eliason are refuted by the plain 
language of the bill and accompanying legislative record. 
F. A Federal Shield Law Imposes Acceptable Costs 
The final argument made by both professors is that a federal shield 
law would impose unacceptable costs on the public.  We have already 
explained why some of the costs they cite—the “loss of reliable, 
probative evidence”301 that will deny criminal defendants exculpatory 
information and will immunize illegal leaks—will not materialize.302  
But Professor Clymer and Professor Eliason maintain those are not 
the only costs of a shield law. 
H.R. 2102 merely codifies existing Department of Justice 
regulations,303 with three changes:  it makes them mandatory, it 
applies them to all cases in federal court, and it requires a judge and 
not the attorney general to decide whether the shield applies.304  That 
point was made very clear during the House floor debate.305  
Nevertheless, Professor Clymer and Professor Eliason oppose the 
shield bill because of the costs and delay it adds to litigation.  
According to Professor Eliason, a statutory journalist’s privilege will 
require “parties and the courts [to] devote time and resources to 
resolving questions concerning the privilege’s applicability.”306
Without question, Professor Eliason is correct.  Federal 
proceedings will be delayed as parties litigate and the court decides 
 300. H.R. REP. NO. 110-370, at 13 (2007) (additional views of Rep. Smith). 
 301. Senate Hearing, supra note 15, at 85 (statement of Steven Clymer, Professor, 
Cornell Law School). 
 302. See supra Parts III.B, IV.D–E. 
 303. See supra notes 297–300 and accompanying text. 
 304. See H.R. 2102, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007). 
 305. See 153 CONG. REC. H11, 592 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2007) (statement of Rep. 
Pence); id. at 595 (written submission of former Solicitor General Theodore B. 
Olson); id. at 599 (statement of Rep. Holt); id. (statement of Rep. Shays). 
 306. Hearing on H.R. 2102, supra note 15, at 54 (testimony of Randall Eliason, 
Professor, George Washington University Law School). 
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the applicability of a shield.  However, those costs are present with or 
without a shield law, as Professor Eliason admits: 
 [Y]ou are not going to subpoena a journalist unless you’ve got no 
other alternative.  Because it is going to slow your case way down 
and you are going to be in a royal battle for or year or two with 
some of the best First Amendment lawyers in the country trying to 
avoid your subpoena . . . .307
Even today, a prosecutor or civil litigant cannot run to the 
courthouse and expect to get a subpoena directing a journalist to 
reveal their source without substantial cost and delay.  As former 
federal prosecutor Bruce Baird concluded, a federal shield law would 
not impair “the prosecution or defense of criminal and regulatory 
cases.”308
On the other hand, the most significant cost is the two-fold 
prospect that the government will have to demonstrate to a federal 
judge that they are entitled to pierce the shield because of an 
applicable exception.  That is why the Bush Administration stated its 
opposition to the shield bill in its Statement of Administration Policy:  
“In order to satisfy the bill’s requirements, prosecutors essentially 
must prove the existence of specific criminal activity in a hearing 
before a judge, with notice to the subjects of the investigation, before 
they will be able to undertake the necessary investigative steps to 
determine whether a crime has occurred.”309
Federal Judge Robert Stack put a finer point on the 
Administration’s argument:  “the only real question is whether 
federal courts should be given some supervisory authority to ensure 
that prosecutors have, in fact, met governing standards before forcing 
reporters to testify.  The answer seems obvious:  yes.”310
Let’s be honest about what is really at stake here.  No prosecutor 
likes being second-guessed by a judge.  That is especially true because 
with a shield law, the government will no longer automatically win 
under criteria for which the attorney general is the sole arbiter.  
While judicial oversight may be an inconvenience that imposes costs 
on the government, those are the costs of having a limited 
government subject to the constraints of the Constitution. 
Prosecutors already are subject to many such constitutional 
inconveniences.  Under the Fourth Amendment, the government 
 307. Eliason Remarks, supra note 200. 
 308. Senate Hearing, supra note 15, at 82. 
 309. 153 CONG. REC. H11, 591 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2007) (statement of Rep. Smith) 
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 310. Id. at 598 (statement of Rep. Udall) (quoting an article by former Solicitor 
General Theodore B. Olson). 
  
2008] ENACTING A REASONABLE FEDERAL SHIELD LAW 1337 
                                                          
must obtain a judicially issued warrant “supported by Oath or 
affirmation” before searching or seizing “persons, houses, papers, 
and effects.”311  That requirement “was promulgated in response to 
the Framers’ distrust of law enforcement’s broad discretion to search 
without judicial oversight.”312  The sweeping authority the executive 
branch has under FISA also is not unlimited, but rather is subject to 
comprehensive oversight by the other two branches of government.313  
Prosecutors likewise are subject to the principle of separation of 
powers to ensure they do not overstep their authority.314  Judicial 
oversight may be inopportune, but that is the price of protecting 
liberty. 
Professor Clymer raises another point related to the question of 
judicial oversight, mirroring some of the Administration’s 
objections.315  He maintains that to demonstrate that an exception to 
the shield applies, the government “would . . . have to reveal secret 
grand jury information and otherwise confidential information . . . to 
persuade the judge to release them.”316  He is correct, but that 
happens all the time in federal court.  It is routinely done for judicial 
determinations of whether to compel the release of information 
under the Freedom of Information Act.  Following a court ruling 
striking down the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program,317 former 
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales conceded that a federal court 
could review applications for counter-terrorism surveillance without 
harming national security.318  Moreover, for nearly three decades the 
Classified Information Procedures Act has governed review of 
classified information in federal courts.319  Federal judges are 
particularly well equipped to apply a shield law.320
In the end, Professor Eliason makes a point that proves the costs of 
a shield law are modest, if any.  He concedes that “if you look at all 
these big recent cases . . . the source is almost never revealed by the 
 311. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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the Fourth Amendment Through the Search-Incident-to-Arrest Exception, 92 IOWA L. REV. 
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reporter.  It comes out in some other way.”321  That’s true.  As a result, 
if we agree that the evidence of a chilling effect on reporters is 
lacking in some respects,322 the data on the other side—whether a 
shield law would actually prevent prosecutors from bringing their 
cases—is completely absent.  Indeed, former Solicitor General Ted 
Olson noted that “[t]he 49 states and the District of Columbia . . . 
have experienced no diminution of law enforcement efforts as a 
result of these shield laws.”323
Conversely, Olson pointed out that the costs without a shield law 
are tremendous: 
Unfortunately, the rules regarding what reporters must disclose, 
and under what circumstances, remain a hopelessly muddied 
mess. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [R]eporters may be protected if they are subpoenaed in state 
court, but not protected at all if the same subpoena is issued by a 
federal court.  No one benefits from that patchwork of legal 
standards. 
[The shield bill would] regularize the rules for reporters, their 
sources, publishers, broadcasters, and judges.324
This “ad hoc, case-by-case” approach325 is much more likely to cause 
delays and additional expense than an approach under the certainty 
of a uniform federal shield law. 
CONCLUSION 
Freedom of the press is essential to safeguard our liberty, as recent 
revelations of government torture,326 warrantless wiretapping,327 
kidnapping, and illegal detention have shown us.328  Confidential 
sources willing to step forward about these abuses are the lifeblood 
for that reporting, particularly with growing government secrecy.  
While Professor Clymer and Professor Eliason raise some valid 
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concerns, the balance of public interests weighs firmly against them.  
“Compelling reporters to testify and, in particular, forcing them to 
reveal the identity of their confidential sources without extraordinary 
circumstances, hurts the public interest.”329  Passage of a federal 
reporters’ shield law like H.R. 2102 standardizes “the rules of the 
game . . . allowing reporters to subject government programs and 
actions to proper scrutiny while ensuring that important information 
cannot be withheld solely on the grounds of privilege.”330  In the 
process, the bill will live up to its name and maintain the free flow of 
information to the public. 
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